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"[T]he clone is reduced to the level of a product made, rather
than a person begotten."'
"God made man in his own image. God intended man to become
one with God.... Cloning and the reprogramming of DNA is
the first serious step in becoming one with God."
2
I. Introduction
Since the first test-tube baby was born in 1978,3 society and medi-
cal technology have combined to yield numerous technologies with
which a child may be born beyond traditional reproductive means.
Each new method has led to litigation and judicial interpretation of
issues concerning procreation.4 These procreative rights necessarily
implicate the Constitution.' However, more subtle constitutional in-
1. Kenneth D. Pimple, Religious, Philosophical, and Ethical Perspectives on Cloning:
The Ethics of Human Cloning and the Fate of Science in a Democratic Society, 32 VA. U.
L. REv. 727, 731 (1998) (quoting Cardinal John O'Connor, Diminished Humanity, in RE-
FLEcnr Ns (Program for Ethics, Sci., & the Env't, Oregon State University), May 1997, at
13).
2. All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 6, 1998) (statement of physicist
Richard Seed), available in 1998 WL 3643278.
3. See Milestones of the Century, TiMn, April 13, 1998, at 87.
4. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); In the Matter of Baby M, 537
A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (finding a surrogacy contract invalid because of conflicts with state
law and public policy); York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424-25 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding
that a fertility clinic agreeing to retain frozen pre-zygotes for donor-clients has an obliga-
tion to return frozen pre-zygotes upon termination of the agreement).
5. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (finding that the decision to have
a child is a fundamental right necessarily included in one's right of privacy). See also Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 535-41 (1942) (upholding procreation as a fundamental
right while ruling that Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
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terests may arise under the Commerce Clause and Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause.6 The recent cloning of "Dolly" the sheep7 and its
potential implications for the cloning of humans beings have thrust
these issues into the forefront of society's collective mind.
In the past, advances in constitutional law have not kept pace
with the phenomenal advances in the biological sciences. In fact, the
text of the Constitution "provides no guidance" on "how scientific
change in particular," and "social change in general," should impact
the interpretation of constitutional guarantees or prohibitions.8 Espe-
cially with the new methods of intervening in the reproductive pro-
cess, some fear that advancements in biological knowledge may lead
to the denigration of individual rights.9 These new reproductive tech-
nologies have also led to concerns about the potential restrictions
upon a woman's privacy and liberty interests when biological repro-
duction is made distinct from the social elements of parenting.' °
Despite these constitutional concerns, these reproductive tech-
nologies remain legally permissible. The introduction of cloning, how-
ever, has been met with resistance far greater than that of previous
techniques. Because cloning offers the possibility of creating numer-
ous, yet identical, human beings that are "made to order," this tech-
nology is "uniquely disturbing" and representative of science's
"unrestrained quest for mastery over nature for the sake of knowl-
edge, power, and profits."" Hence, a comparison of these reproduc-
tive methods provides insight into how previous methods have been
legally permissible while the current tide of public sentiment urges
against allowing human cloning.
This Note compares the similarities and differences, constitution-
ally speaking, between cloning and other assisted reproductive tech-
nologies. Part II provides the basic scientific background regarding
cloning and several assisted reproductive technologies. By learning
the details of the different methods, we can precisely understand the
6. See Marianne Lavelle, Clone Bills, Clone Suits, Apr. 7, 1997 NAT'L L.J. A14.
7. See George J. Annas, Human Cloning: Should the United States Legislate Against
It? Yes: Individual Dignity Demands Nothing Less, 83 May A.B.A. J. 80, 80 (1997).
8. Sheila Jasanoff, Biology And The Bill Of Rights: Can Science Reframe the Constitu-
tion?, 13 Ami. J.L. & MED. 249, 254 (1987). The only explicit mention of science in the
Constitution is the authorization "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" by
granting exclusive rights to authors and inventors in their works for a limited time. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9. See Jasanoff, supra note 8, at 253.
10. See id.
11. Scientific Discoveries and Cloning: Challenges for Public Policy Before the Sub-
comm. on Public Health and Safety of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
available in 1997 WL 8221174 (1997) [hereinafter Scientific Discoveries and Cloning] (testi-
mony of George J. Annas, Founder of Law, Medicine, and Ethics Program at Boston Uni-
versity School of Public Health).
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steps of embryo creation and, thus, delineate the constitutional rights
related to each method. Part III discusses the various constitutional
issues raised by the four major techniques of assisted reproductive
technologies: artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, surrogacy
contracts, and human cloning. Necessary to the consideration of clon-
ing as a new reproductive method is reflection upon the potential ethi-
cal harms and benefits of cloning. By comparing the constitutional
ramifications of the other assisted reproductive technologies with
cloning as well as taking into account the ethical concerns cloning
poses, this Note suggests that human cloning is constitutionally per-
missible within certain legal parameters. Finally, Part IV proposes a
plausible legal framework within which cloning can be utilized in ac-
cordance with constitutional theory and societal values.
H. Background
While the term "cloning" has been used recently to describe the
technological breakthrough of a sheep clone in Scotland, its scientific
meaning actually encompasses several different reproductive technol-
ogies. In order to understand the current scientific ramifications of
"Dolly," one must recognize the various stages and advancements of
cloning after which one can knowledgeably compare cloning with the
range of other reproductive techniques available.
A. What Is Cloning?
1. History
The idea of cloning emerged in 1938 with Hans Spemann, a
human embryologist. 2 Then in 1952 and 1962, respectively, scientists
first cloned frog embryos and adult frogs. 3 Finally, the more difficult
mammalian effort was a success with the first cloned mice in 1979.14
The introduction of cloning into the national arena came in the
early 1970s when recombinant DNA ("rDNA") and gene-splicing
techniques were developed.'" By using rDNA, scientists isolate a spe-
cific piece of an individual's DNA sequence and splice it into another
individual's DNA sequence,'16 hence the name gene-splicing. The sec-
ond individual develops in accordance with the new DNA's genetic
12. See Clarke D. Forsythe, Legal Perspectives On Cloning: Human Cloning and the
Constitution, 32 VAL. U.L. Rlv. 469, 480 (1998).
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See Barry J. Swanson, The Federal Courts and the Constitution, 84 MicH. L. REv.
658, 659 (1986) (reviewing IRA H. CARMEN, CLONING AND THE CONSTrrrUTON: AN IN-
QUIRY INTO GOVERNMENTAL POLICYMAXING AND GENEnc EXPERIMENTATION (1985)).
16. See John R. Harding, Jr., Beyond Abortion: Human Genetics and the New Eugen-
ics, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 471, 475 (1991) (citing PR.SIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF
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directions. Through gene-splicing, even DNA from different species
may be combined. 7 Thus, the offspring combinations resulting from
crossing various species are limitless. These possibilities of manipulat-
ing genes and controlling the "production" of humans could conjure
up fantastic images of armies of identical automatons and could serve
as the impetus for international discussion. While this technology
struck fear in some, it also provided scientists with the hope of pre-
dicting "both an individual's expected performance as well as the per-
formance of future generations."' 8 Concurrently, these experiments
could modify the collective set of existing human genes, known as the
"gene pool."' 9
However, any broad-based interest in the rDNA technique being
used to "copy" humans was tempered by several factors. First, even in
the mid-1980s, the technology was only capable of use in a single-gene
context.20 That is, the technique could only be used to change a ge-
netic trait if that particular trait was controlled by just one gene.2 '
But, if a genetic trait was controlled by more than one gene (a polyge-
netic trait), the technology was more difficult to utilize. Second,
knowledge about the more complex, polygenetic traits was scarce;
scientists were unable to trace many traits to their origins located on
various genes.22 Thus, there were even fewer applications of gene-
splicing to polygenetic traits. Finally, the data was still in its primitive
stages and scientists were not ready to use human beings as recipients
of the isolated gene(s). At that time, cloning humans through this
method appeared a distant possibility.
Then in 1993, researchers from the George Washington Univer-
sity Medical Center released findings of the first reported experiment
involving the cloning of human embryos through a process called blas-
tomere separation.23 Blastomere separation was not a new tech-
nique.24 It had been successfully used on animals for over twenty
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIOR RESEARCH, SPLICING
LE 9 (1982)).
17. See id. (citing BioLAv 104 (1989)).
18. Id. at 476 (citing Louis J. Elsas II, A Clinical Approach to Legal and Ethical
Problems in Human Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 811, 815 (1990)).
19. Jan Ziegler, Battle of the Potato Field Highlights Future of Genetic Engineering,
U.P.I., Aug. 13, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires file.




23. See Gina Kolata, Scientist Clones Human Embryos, and Creates an Ethical Chal-
lenge, N.Y. T~ms, Oct. 24, 1993, at Al.
24. See id. See also Jerry Adler et al., Clone Hype, NEVSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1993, at 60;
Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Cloning: Where Do We Draw the Line?, TIME, Nov. 8, 1993, at 64;
Kathy Sawyer, Researchers Clone Human Embryo Cells; Work is "Small Step" in Aiding
SPRING 1999] CLONING AND OTHER ART
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years.' Nevertheless, the application to human embryos renewed
public concern.
26
The process of blastomere separation begins with the creation of
an embryo for cloning. To do this, the female receives hormones to
stimulate the ovaries into producing more eggs.27 If the hormones are
successful, a doctor removes the eggs and places them in a petri dish
or a test tube.' After five to twelve hours, semen is mixed with the
eggs.29 If fertilization occurs, an embryo is created. Then, following
the procedure used at George Washington, the fertilized egg grows
and divides into a two-cell embryo inside its natural membrane shell,
or zona pellucida.3 ° Each of these cells is a "blastomere."31 The sci-
entist dissolves the natural zona pellucida,32 separates the two cells,
33
and then coats each cell with an artificial zona pellucida3 4 In theory,
the new embryos are genetically identical to one another and each
could be developed for implantation. The lead researcher in this pro-
ject, Dr. Jerry L. Hall,35 declared that he conducted the research only
to increase success for couples using in vitro fertilization.36 Although
none of the embryos at George Washington survived longer than six
days,37 the actual "cloning" of the first human embryo through blasto-
mere separation brought the fear, which had been initiated by gene-
splicing, into clearer focus for the general population.
2. The "Dolly" Technology and its Significance
The recent cloning of an adult sheep named "Dolly" brought
cloning into the international spotlight in February 1997.38 The
method employed by Scottish researcher Ian Wilmut involved ex-
Infertile, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1993, at A4; Rebecca Kolberg, Human Embryo Cloning
Reported, 262 SCIENCE 652 (1993).
25. See J. Madeleine Nash, They Clone Cattle, Don't They?, TIME, Nov. 8, 1993, at 68.
26. See Adler et al., supra note 24, at 60.
27. See CARL WOOD, TEST-TUBE CONCEPTION 57 (1984).
28. See id. at 61.
29. See id at 69.
30. See The Science of Scrambling an Egg, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8 1993, at 62 [hereinafter
Scrambling].
31. Karen Dawson, Introduction: An Outline of Scientific Aspects of Human Embryo
Research, in EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SoCIAL ISsUES 3, 4 (Pe-
ter Singer et al. eds., 1990).
32. See Scrambling, supra note 30, at 62.
33. See id.
34. See Kolberg, supra note 24, at 652; Adler et al., supra note 24, at 62.
35. See Debra Feuerberg Duffy, Note, To Be or Not To Be: The Legal Ramifications of
the Cloning of Human Embryos, 21 RurGERS COMrUTER & TECH. L.J. 189, 190 (1995).
36. See Mona S. Amer, Comment, Breaking the Mold: Human Embryo Cloning and its
Implications for a Right to Individuality, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1659, 1660 (1996).
37. See Sawyer, supra note 24, at A4.
38. See Annas, supra note 7, at 80.
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tracting genetic material from the body cell of an adult sheep and re-
moving the nucleus from an unfertilized egg.3 9 Researchers then
inserted the extracted genetic material into an egg, implanted that egg
into a female sheep, and allowed the egg to gestate and yield a geneti-
cally identical baby lamb.4" The procedure is referred to as "somatic
cell nuclear transfer" ("SCNT"). 41 This technique is unique because
baby Dolly is an exact "twin" of an adult animal.42
Scientists and the world immediately began discussing the possi-
ble application of SCNT to humans. Responding in March 1997 to
this new development, President Clinton prohibited the use of federal
funds for cloning humans43 and requested the National Bioethics Ad-
visory Commission ("NBAC" or the "Commission") review the ethi-
cal and legal issues associated with cloning technology. 44 On June 9,
1997, the Commission recommended a continuation of the ban on fed-
eral funding and encouraged the private sector to support this prohibi-
tion while cloning discussions proceeded. a
Since then, the Dolly technology has been confirmed and utilized
by scientists at the University of Wisconsin-Madison to clone five dif-
ferent species, including rhesus monkeys.46 Although all the
pregnancies ended in miscarriages, scientists were able to use the
"Dolly" method to create viable embryos of a wide variety of ani-
mals.47 Also, scientists at the University of Hawaii employed the
Dolly technique in a more efficient way to clone several generations
of mice.4 8 Then, in December 1998, Japanese scientists employed a
variation of the Dolly technology to successfully clone 8 calves out of
10 attempts.49 In that same month, researchers in South Korea made
39. See Stephen A. Newman, Human Cloning and the Family: Reflections on Cloning
Existing Children, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 523, 524 (1997).
40. See All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, June 4, 1997), available in 1997
WL 12831736.
41. See NATIONAL BIoETHICs ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING HuMAN BEINGS: RE-
PORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BioETHIcs ADVISORY COMMISSION 1
(1997).
42. See id.
43. See Forsythe, supra note 12, at 469.
44. See The Clone Age, 83-Jul A.B.A. J. 68, 68 (1997).
45. See Bioethics Commission Backs Federal Human Cloning Ban Pending More
Study, Debate, 1 NO. 15 MEALEY's Lrno. REP.: BIOTECHNOLOGY (1997).
46. See 5 Species Cloned Using Cow's Eggs, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 1998, at Al.
47. See id.
48. See Ellen Ruppel Shell, Cloning of Humans will be Inevitable; What Have We
Done, Done, Done?, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 5, 1999, at A6, available in 1999 WL
9417134; Human Embryo Clone, S. Korean Team Claims, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 17,
1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 22565589.
49. See David Derbyshire, Made in Japan, A Herd of Cloned Calves, DAIIY MAIL,
Dec. 8, 1998, at 9, available in 1998 WL 21418132. This 80% success rate is a vast improve-
ment over the creation of Dolly after 277 attempts by the Scottish scientists. See Japanese
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an unconfirmed claim that they used the University of Hawaii tech-
nique to clone a 30-year-old woman, yielding an embryo that devel-
oped to four cells before researchers stopped the experiment.50
The primary significance of Dolly and her technological "off-
spring" is obvious: each development in cloning technology brings sci-
ence one step closer to cloning human beings. Soon the question may
not be "Can we?," but "Should we?" 51 Because human cloning is a
potential method of reproduction and child-rearing is a goal in most
societies, cloning is a development that many may encourage, or at
least a technology in which many may desire more knowledge. Given
this possible outcome and assuming cloning is an accepted form of
reproduction,52 society must determine the extent to which the law
should regulate human cloning.
B. Other Assisted Reproductive Technologies ("ART")
A working knowledge of the various reproductive techniques is
required before comparing the differences between cloning and other
methods of reproduction. One common method of assisted concep-
tion is artificial insemination. This technique is not a new one. In
fact, it has been used to reproduce animals for centuries.53 Artificial
insemination separates procreation from coital reproduction by in-
serting sperm into the uterus, cervical canal, or vagina of a woman.54
Because this technique is relatively inexpensive and widely available,
Clone 8 Genetically Identical Calves from Cell of Single Adult Cow, TRANsPLANr NEws,
Dec. 17, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9525678.
50. See Human Embryo Clone, S. Korean Team Claims, supra note 48, at Al.
51. See Humans Will Be Cloned-We Must Be Prepared, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1997,
at A8.
52. This is an assumption that not all may embrace, but this Note will argue in its
support.
53. See Monica Shah, Note, Modern Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues Concern-
ing Cryopreservation and Posthumous Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 548 (1996).
54. See Christine A. Djalleta, Comment, A Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye: Proposed
Amendments to the Uniform Probate Code in Light of New Reproductive Technology, 67
TEMP. L. Rlv. 335, 337 (1994). Artificial insemination encompasses two major categories.
When the source of the semen is the woman's husband, this method is referred to as "artifi-
cial insemination by husband" ("AIH"). See Walter Wadlington, Artificial Conception:
The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. Rtv. 465, 468-73 (1983). When the source of
semen is from a male other than the woman's husband, the process is called "artificial
insemination by donor" ("AID"), and the donor is generally paid for his contribution. See
id. An additional subcategory, in which the semen is a combination of the husband's and
other male's sperm, is called "artificial insemination, combined" ("AIC"). See Sue Teper
& E. Malcolm Symonds, ARTImCIAL INSEMINATION BY DONOR: PROBLEMS AND PERSPEC-
"lVES, IN DEVELOPMENTS IN Human Reproduction and Their Eugenic, Ethical Implica-
tions 19 (C.O. Carter ed., 1983). This form of artificial insemination has fallen into disfavor
because it causes ambiguity in the child's genetic history. See id.
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15% of all infertile married couples employ this procedure.5 5 Statisti-
cally, during a 12-month period between 1986 and 1987 in the United
States, 172,000 women underwent artificial insemination, with an av-
erage cost of $953 per patient.56 Of those 172,000 women, 65,000 gave
birth,57 a nearly 38% success rate. Since its inception, a conservative
estimate indicates that women in the United States have conceived
over 500,000 children through artificial insemination.5
A second common reproductive technique is in vitro fertilization.
Literally translated as "in glass" fertilization, this technique involves
retrieving an egg from a woman's ovaries, fertilizing that egg by mix-
ing it with sperm, and implanting the fertilized egg in the mother's
uterus. 59 The eggs are retrieved after drug stimulation, in which sev-
eral eggs can be removed at once, or during a woman's normal men-
strual cycle.60 The eggs are removed through a procedure referred to
as laparoscopy, or through a needle aspiration.6' These eggs can come
from the woman who will ultimately carry the fertilized egg to term or
from another donor woman.6 2 The fertilized ovum then develops into
a two- to eight-cell preembryo, which is introduced to the uterus,
where it will "hopefully implant and result in pregnancy. "63
About 50% of in vitro fertilization patients opt for cryopreserva-
tion-freezing their embryos for later use.' 4 During cryopreservation,
technicians cool and dehydrate the embryo in order to preserve the
frozen embryo for an extended period of time.65 A woman utilizes
cryopreservation when several eggs are retrieved at once, resulting in
55. See Shah, supra note 53, at 549.
56. See id. (citing McAllister, Defining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Re-
productive Technology: Implications for Inheritance, 29 REAL PROP. PRoB. & TR. 55, 59
(1994)).
57. See id.
58. See Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction
and the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 193, 201 (1997) (citing ROBERT BLANK
& JANNA MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, AND CoNFLiCr-
ING RIGHTS 86 (1995)).
59. See Shah, supra note 53, at 549-50.
60. See id. at 549.
61. See id. at 549-50.
62. See id. at 550.
63. Id. (citing McAllister, supra note 56, at 61).
64. See id. (citing McAllister, supra note 56, at 62).
65. See id. at 550. The process of cryopreservation involves placing the embryo in an
aqueous medium. See id. (citing McAllister, supra note 56, at 62). Then, the embryo is
treated with cryoprotectant, which replaces the water in the cells after dehydration. See id.
(citing McAllister, supra note 56, at 62-63). The cryoprotectant prevents ice crystals from
forming inside the cells, which may lead to tissue damage. See id. (citing McAllister, supra
note 56, at 63). The embryo is cooled gradually to -80 degrees Celsius, and then trans-
ferred into liquid nitrogen, where it is quickly cooled to -196 degrees Celsius. See id. For
thawing, the embryo is rehydrated with water and rinsed of the cryoprotectant prior to
insertion into the uterus. See id.
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numerous embryos. 66 By freezing the embryos, a woman prevents the
need to implant all the embryos at the same time, which could lead to
a multiple pregnancy.6' In addition, it reduces the frequency in which
a woman's eggs must be retrieved.68 Finally, it facilitates the transfer
of the embryo during a normal menstrual cycle instead of a drug-in-
duced cycle, which renders the uterus less receptive to embryo im-
plantation.69 Up until 1990, it is estimated that sixty children were
born from frozen embryos.7"
Still, there are additional reproductive technologies available,
which are less widely used. In gamete intrafallopian transfer
("GIFT"), the unfertilized egg and sperm are placed directly into the
woman's fallopian tube.71 If GIFT is successful, fertilization, cleavage,
and implantation take place in the same way as with coital reproduc-
tion.72 In 1987 alone, at least forty-nine children were born through
GIFT conception.73 In 1989, GIFT yielded clinical pregnancy in 30%
of its recipients, with a 23% delivery rate.74
In zygote intrafallopian transfer ("ZIFT"), the egg is fertilized in
vitro and then inserted into the woman's fallopian tubes.75 Some phy-
sicians argue that placement of the zygote directly into the tube is a
more physiologically correct approach because fertilization normally
takes place in the fallopian tube.76 In 1989, ZIFT procedures resulted
in a 21% clinical pregnancy rate and a 17% delivery rate.77
Another type of reproductive technology is uterine lavage and
embryo transfer. In this procedure, the eggs are fertilized in the do-
nor woman's body through insemination and allowed to remain there





70. See id. at 551 (citing McAllister, supra note 56, at 63).
71. See LEON SPEROFF ET AL., CLINICAL GYNECOLOGIC ENDOCRINOLOGY AND INFER-
TILrrY 931 (5th ed. 1994).
72. See Shah, supra note 53, at 551 (citing McAllister, supra note 56, at 64).
73. See id. (citing McAllister, supra note 56, at 64).
74. See American Fertility Society, In Vitro Fertilization-Embryo Transfer (IVF-ET) in
the United States: 1989 Results from the IVF-ET Registry, 55 FERnLrry & STEaLrrY 14, 18
(1991) [hereinafter 1989 IVF-ET Registry].
75. See C. Staessen et al., An 18-Month Survey of Infertility Treatment by In Vitro Fer-
tilization, Gamete and Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer, and Replacement of Frozen-Thawed
Embryos, 6 J. IN Vrrno FERTILIZATION & EMBRYO TRANSFER 22,24 (1989).
76. See id. at 28.
77. See 1989 IVF-ET Registry, supra note 74, at 19.
78. See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The "Orwellian Nightmare" Reconsidered: A Pro-
posed Regulatory Framework for the Advanced Reproduction Technologies, 25 GA. L. REv.
625, 642 (1991).
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via a transcervical catheter to release the embryo for transfer.7 9 The
final step of transfer can only occur when the recipient's ovulatory
cycle is synchronized with the donor's cycle."0 As of 1996, four chil-
dren have been born using this technique.8' A possible drawback is
that sometimes the embryo is not successfully flushed out of the do-
nor's uterus, forcing the donor to proceed with the pregnancy. 82
Finally, one method integrates these previously mentioned repro-
ductive techniques with private contracting to facilitate the birth of a
child. This method is referred to as third-party assisted reproduction,
or surrogacy. In surrogacy, a third party female agrees to act as the
gestational carrier for a couple who may be able to create a healthy
embryo, but is otherwise medically unable to carry that embryo to
term. 3 The couple's embryo would be created through in vitro fertili-
zation and then implanted in the uterus of the surrogate mother, who
agrees to give the offspring back to the couple. Considering the vari-
ous permutations of parental actors, surrogacy may involve donor ga-
metes from both members of the infertile couple, from two entirely
unrelated individuals, or any combination thereof.84
II. Analysis
A careful comparison of these reproductive technologies requires
a detailed delineation of the constitutional rights and issues implicated
by these techniques. By comparing the constitutional concerns raised
by each technology, one can begin to understand the similarities and
differences between cloning and other ART, and thus reach a more
informed decision about whether society at-large is prepared to accept
human cloning as a form of ART. Because case law on ART is rela-
tively new and scarce, this analysis represents both issues interpreted
by the courts and issues derived from examination by the academy.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See Shah, supra note 53, at 551.
82. See id.
83. See Eggen, supra note 78, at 640. The common situations requiring a gestational
carrier would be an inadequate or absent uterus or a medical condition that would render
gestation an unacceptable risk of harm to the woman. See Ethics Committee of the Ameri-
can Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 53 FER-
TILrrY & STER.rry 1S, 64S (Supp. 2 1990).
84. Recall, for instance, that in the widely-publicized case of Baby M, the child was
conceived through a combination of the gestational carrier's genetic material and the
sperm from the husband of the infertile couple. See In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d
1227 (N.J. 1988). These various combinations, however, are critical in designating the legal
parental rights of the parties involved.
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A. Constitutional Issues Facing the Other ART
While this Note describes a range of several reproductive tech-
nologies, the constitutional inquiry focuses upon the more-established
and broad techniques of artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization,
and surrogacy vis-a-vis cloning. The three former techniques most ac-
curately represent the general reproductive methods discussed by the
courts and academics. They also create the broad categories into
which the remaining reproductive techniques tend to fit because of
similarities in scientific procedure and genetic source material.
1. Artificial Insemination ("A")
The constitutional questions arising from AI serve as a starting
point to a discussion of issues facing all the assisted reproductive tech-
nologies. First, debates over ART center upon the constitutional right
to privacy." Specifically, the question of whether the putative parents
have the fundamental right to dispose of their embryos as they choose
stems from the individual right to privacy.8 6 Generally, this right to
privacy has been implicated in the constitutional discussions relating
to family, marriage, contraception, and abortion.8 7 Because reproduc-
tive technologies include reference to these topics, the right to privacy
is a necessary component implicated in the discourse on assisted re-
productive technologies.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court rec-
ognized a constitutional right to privacy.88 Although not specifically
enumerated in the Constitution, this right to privacy stems from the
"penumbras" of "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights."89 These
penumbras emanate from the following constitutional provisions: the
right of association9", the prohibition against quartering of soldiers,91
the right to be secure in your person and home,92 the right against
self-incrimination, 93 and the holding that enumeration in the Constitu-
tion does not deny rights retained by the people.94 Specifically, the
Court in Griswold declared that the right to privacy includes the right
85. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
86. See Kim Schaefer, Comment, In-Vitro Fertilization, Frozen Embryos, and the Right
to Privacy-Are Mandatory Donation Laws Constitutional?, 22 PAc. L.J. 87, 98 (1990).
87. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438; Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
88. See 381 U.S. 479.
89. Id. at 484.
90. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
91. See U.S. CONST. amend. III; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
92. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
93. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
94. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
of married couples to use contraceptives. 95 Along with the right to
prevent reproduction, the Court has also found that the right to pri-
vacy necessarily extends to the right to procreate.96 Continuing with
this line of reasoning, the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird recognized a
right to procreate in single individuals, not only married couples. 97 In
broadening this right even further, the Court has determined in Roe v.
Wade that a woman has a right to decide whether to terminate a preg-
nancy.98 In fact, the Court found that this type of privacy right derives
from the Fourteenth Amendment99 and includes a woman's right to
have an abortion. 10 Furthermore, the Court has found that decisions
concerning procreation, contraception, marriage, child-rearing, and
family relationships are personal ones, which may be made without
government interference. 01 To justify the regulation of fundamental
rights, 0 2 such as the right to privacy, the government bears the bur-
den of demonstrating a compelling state interest.
0 3
The Court has found this right to be nearly inviolate in the con-
text of the right to procreate. Furthermore, lower courts have sup-
ported the ideal that this fundamental right to privacy encompasses
non-coital reproduction. In Lifchez v. Hartigan,"°4 the court invali-
dated a law which restricted the treatment of embryos and found that
concomitant with the right to contraception is the "right to submit to a
medical procedure that may bring about, rather than prevent, preg-
nancy." 5 The Lifchez court reasoned that because there is no com-
pelling state interest which prevents a woman from attaining an
95. See 381 U.S. at 485.
96. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
97. See 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972). There, Justice Brennan provided in dicta that "[i]f
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." See id. at 453.
98. See 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
99. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.., deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ... .
100. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
101. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
102. In terms of constitutional doctrine, the finding of a fundamental constitutional
right is critical to attaining strict scrutiny analysis. When a right is fundamental, a statute
that limits that right can be upheld only if it passes the strict scrutiny standard proving that
(1) the state's objective is "compelling" and (2) the statute is "necessary" to the accom-
plishment of that objective. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
However, if the implicated right is not fundamental, the statute may only be struck down if
it is "arbitrary or without reasonable relation" to some state purpose. Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). Thus, if new assisted reproductive technologies implicate a fun-
damental right, statutes regulating these technologies would be subject to the higher strict
scrutiny standard.
103. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 686.
104. 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
105. Id. at 1377.
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abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy, there is also no compelling
interest to infringe upon other protected reproductive activities in the
same period. 10 6 More explicitly, in Cameron v. Board of Education,1"7
the court held that the Supreme Court's right to privacy jurisprudence
guarantees a woman's right of control over her reproductive func-
tions, thereby ensuring her right to impregnate herself through artifi-
cial insemination. 08 Indeed, at least one scholar has argued that the
Supreme Court's protection of the right to procreate via coital repro-
duction must extend to non-coital reproduction because both methods
concern creating a child and a family to raise that child, and both sup-
port the value and intent of having children.' 9
The Supreme Court's right to privacy cases construct a nearly im-
permeable right to procreate. Supported by lower court decisions
which hold that procreative rights extend specifically to artificial in-
semination and most likely other ART,"' AI and human cloning are
likely constitutionally protected forms of reproduction which may
only be infringed upon with a showing of compelling state interest.
Such compelling interest would be difficult to prove because of its
probable basis upon subjective ethical and moral rationales that argue
to prevent the birth of a healthy child."' Nearly any argument against
the birth of healthy children is dubious in a society which clearly val-
ues building families through progeny.
Another consideration is that artificial insemination is not neces-
sarily reproduction in the purest sense of the term. In the typical AI
setting, a husband whose wife is impregnated by the sperm of another
man, and who later participates in the birth of that child, is not that
child's biological father." 2 The use of a syringe instead of sexual in-
tercourse "does not alter the biological facts in any way. 113 Rather
than reproducing in the way that is traditionally understood, the hus-
band is acting as the adoptive father, raising the child conceived from
another man." 4 This appears to be an exercise of the procreative
right of the mother because she is now bearing a child conceived of
her own genetic contribution. In terms of the husband, however, the
106. See id.
107. 795 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
108. See id. at 237.
109. See Lawrence Wu, Note, Family Planning Through Human Cloning: Is There a
Fundamental Right?, 98 COLUM. L. Rv. 1461, 1491 (1998).
110. See Cameron, 795 F. Supp. at 237; Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1377.
111. See Paul Tully, Comment, Dollywood Is Not Just a Theme Park in Tennessee Any-
more: Unwarranted Prohibitory Human Cloning Legislation and Policy Guidelines for a
Regulatory Approach to Cloning, 31 J. MARSHALL L. Rnv. 1385, 1412 (1998).
112. See Katheryn D. Katz, Ghost Mothers: Human Egg Donation and the Legacy of the
Past, 57 ALB. L. REv. 733, 765 (1994).
113. Id.
114. See id.
constitutional issue is whether this form of reproduction actually in-
volves him or not. If not, then perhaps the fundamental right to pro-
create is not implicated at all in his situation. In which case, any
regulation of artificial insemination pertaining to the husband might
not be subject to judicial strict scrutiny."'
2. In Vitro Fertilization ("IVF")
In vitro fertilization differs from artificial insemination by al-
lowing not only the sperm to be acquired from a donor (who need not
be the husband), but also allows the egg contribution to come from
someone other than the gestational carrier. Because the scientific the-
ory behind IVF is so similar to that of AI, the previous discussion of
procreative liberty and the definition of reproduction also applies in
the context of in vitro fertilization.
Currently, there is only one federal law, the Fertility Clinic Suc-
cess Rate and Certification Act of 1992 ("the Act"), pertaining di-
rectly to assisted reproductive technologies." 6 The Act has two basic
parts. First, the Act requires all assisted reproductive technologies
programs to report pregnancy success rates to the Secretary of Health
and Human Services through the Centers for Disease Control
("CDC")." 7 These success rates would, in turn, be made available to
the public,"' who were misled by these statistics when reporting was
only voluntary."19 Second, the Act directs the CDC to develop a
model program that each state could adopt regarding the certification
of embryo laboratories.120 Furthermore, the Act requires that this
program provide for inspections to check for compliance with certifi-
cation requirements.' 2 ' The standards of these requirements would
be established so as to ensure consistent performance of ART proce-
dures, accurate recordkeeping at certified labs, and quality assur-
ance." 2 These inspection results would also be available to the
115. Of course, this line of reasoning would not apply to those situations in which the
wife is artificially inseminated with semen donated by her husband.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1 to a-7 (1992).
117. See id. at § 263a-l(a)(1).
118. See id. at § 263a-5(1)(A). One of the purposes behind the Act was to standardize
the reporting of success rates. See id. To do so, the Act has defined the "pregnancy success
rate" as the ratio between the number of live births and the number of oocyte retrievals or
ovarian stimulations completed in any one ART center. See id. at §263a-1(b)
119. See Fertility Clinic Services: Hearing before Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 102-120 (1992) [hereinafter Hear-
ing] (indicating that often infertile couples are misled because success rates vary depending
upon the measuring factors employed by individual clinics).
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2(a)(1).
121. See id. at § 263a-2(g).
122. See id. at § 263a-2(d).
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public.'"z This process would hopefully meet the objective of increas-
ing public confidence in these technologies and improving the overall
quality of care on a national level." 4
Regrettably, the Act's reforms are not particularly novel or effi-
cacious because "they are mostly a codification of existing prac-
tices. 1 25 Over ninety percent of ART facilities already voluntarily
relate their success rates to the Society for Assisted Reproductive
Technology.' 2 6 Such results are published in a periodical that does not
list success rates for individual clinics, but provides general statistics
by summarizing data from all reporting clinics.' 27 Similarly, the Act
does not require publication of rates from individual clinics, but only
publication of the names of individual clinics that do not report their
success rates.' 28 Also, the Act fails to offer guidance regarding the
status of the embryo, embryo contract enforceability, and resolution
of disputes over embryo disposition.1
2 9
Thus, because the body of federal law concerning ART is scarce,
this area of science is ripe for extensive regulation and legislation.
130
Legislation may be needed as the applications of ART expand beyond
the traditional couple seeking to have a family. For example, people
might conceive a child to act as a genetic or organ donor or to sell to
infertile couples. Such legislation could originate under the auspices
of the Congress' commerce power.1
3 '
The IVF technique is not a mere medical procedure, but involves
the highly emotional decision of child-bearing. Couples entering a re-
productive technology program may have exhausted all other types of
treatment and thus may be "emotionally, physically, and financially
123. See id. at § 263a-5.
124. See Hearing, supra note 119, at 49 (statement of Leon Speroff, President of the
American Fertility Society).
125. Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34
Hous. L. REV. 609, 643 (1997).
126. See Hearing, supra note 119, at 17.
127. See Daar, supra note 125, at 643.
128. See 42 U.S.C § 263a-5.
129. See Nicole L. Cucci, Note, Constitutional Implications of In Vitro Fertilization Pro-
cedures, 72 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 417, 434 (1998). See Part III. B for a discussion of the
proposed classifications for the status of frozen embryos. See generally Cucci, supra, for a
fuller discussion of the enforceability of embryo contracts and resolution of embryo dispo-
sition disputes, which is beyond the scope of this Note.
130. Only a handful of states have expressed a legal opinion about ART by passing laws
related to the practice and scope of ART. See Daar, supra note 125, at 646. Those states
include California, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. See id. at 646-51.
131. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States .... "). See also Part III. B.
2 for an explanation of the Commerce Clause doctrine.
CLONING AND OTHER ART
depleted."' 32 While fertility clinics are located in individual states,
couples may travel to another state to undergo these medical proce-
dures or seek to have cryopreserved embryos transported across state
boundaries.' 33 Understanding that the use of IVF requires a substan-
tial expenditure on the part of the hopeful parents,3 4 the crossing of
state boundaries to facilitate treatment renders IVF a perfect candi-
date for federal regulation under the interstate commerce power.1
35
3. Surrogacy
Employing a surrogate mother as a reproductive technique takes
the technology of IVF or AI and adds the variable of private con-
tracting. That is, surrogacy involves a woman who, by the terms of a
contract, agrees to undergo artificial insemination or in vitro fertiliza-
tion, to carry a baby to term, and to release that child to the couple
after birth, usually in return for a fee.'3 6 Hence, the prior discussion
of constitutional issues facing IVF and AI, and their coterminous
problems, is incorporated in the constitutional implications of surro-
gate mothering. 3
7
132. Eggen, supra note 78, at 648-49; A. Lopata, et al., Use of In Vitro Fertilization in
the Infertile Couple, in THE INFERTILE COUPLE 266 (R.J. Pepperell, et al., eds., 1987).
133. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
134. In 1988, the IVF procedure cost $6,700. See Shah, supra note 53, at 549.
135. See U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that a regulation falls within
Congress' commerce power if "the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate com-
merce"); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251 (1918); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). Congress might also enact laws under
the "necessary and proper" clause. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 18 (providing that,
"The Congress shall have Power... [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States .... "). This clause permits
Congress to pass laws in order to facilitate the execution of the "foregoing powers," includ-
ing the same Commerce power. See id.
136. See generally Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In the Matter of Baby
M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
137. Note that this discussion does not include the proposition that surrogacy contracts
may be unenforceable because they are against the common law notion of public policy.
Polls show that the majority of people in the United States believe that surrogacy contracts
should be enforceable and legal motherhood should be founded upon contractual intent.
See Poll Shows Most in U.S. Back Baby M Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1987, at A39
(citing New York Times-CBS Poll in which 69% of the 1045 adults polled said that surro-
gate mothers should have to abide by agreements to relinquish custody in favor of the
intended parents). Nonetheless, only four states have laws making surrogacy arrangements
enforceable: Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Virginia. See FLA. STAT. AN.
§ 742.15 (West 1994); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (Michie 1993); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 168(B)(21) (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-159 to 20-165 (Michie 1995). Surrogacy
contracts are unenforceable in at least seven states: Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan,
Nebraska, North Dakota, and Tennessee. See Amz. REV. STAT. § 25-218(A) (1995); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-1 (Michie 1987); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713(A) (West 1995);
MicH. Con'. LAWs ANN. § 722.855 (West 1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 200(1) (1994);
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Case law indicates that constitutional concerns raised in the sur-
rogacy framework may take a back seat to the "best interests" of the
child.'38 For instance, in Quillion v. Walcott,3 9 the Court held that a
natural father does not have a constitutional right to block the adop-
tion of his child born out of wedlock.' 40 In Quillion, the natural fa-
ther, Walcott, never developed a parental relationship or bond with
the child.' 4 ' Because the stepfather, however, had developed such a
relationship with the child, the Court found that adoption by the step-
father better served the child's interests.' 42 The Court held that
Walcott's genetic link to the child was insufficient to outweigh the
"best interests of the child."'143 Applied in the surrogacy context, this
holding might give intended fathers, regardless of their genetic ties or
constitutional objections, the right to retain custody of the child as
long as a social parent-child relationship existed.
The best interests of the child have also outweighed constitu-
tional objections raised by both the Equal Protection Clause' 44 and
the Due Process Clause.' 45 In Caban v. Mohammed,'46 for example,
the Supreme Court struck down a New York statute that required the
mother's permission, but not the father's, before adoption could oc-
cur.'4 7 The Court held that the statute, which only applied to children
born out of wedlock, violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause because it was constitutionally impermissible to dis-
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(46)(A) (1995). New
York, Utah, Washington, and the District of Columbia have gone so far as to impose civil
or criminal penalties on parties to such agreements. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 123 (Mc-
Kinney 1995) (civil penalty for entering into agreement and felony for third parties who
recruit or procure women to act as surrogates); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(1)(d) (1995)
(violation is a class B misdemeanor); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.250 (West 1996)
(violation constitutes gross misdemeanor); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-402 (1995) (civil penalty
not to exceed $10,000 and/or one year imprisonment for entering into, assisting, or induc-
ing another to enter into a surrogate parenting contract).
138. See generally Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
139. 434 U.S. 246 (1977).
140. See id. at 255-56.
141. See id. at 256.
142. See id. at 255.
143. Id.
144. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979); see also infra notes 147-151
and accompanying text. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides, "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
145. See infra notes 152-159 and accompanying text. The Due Process Clause states,
"No State shall ..- deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ...." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
146. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
147. See id. at 392-94.
tinguish between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers. 4 , In so
holding, the Court did, however, permit states to distinguish between
parents who have formed relationships with their children and those
who have not.149 In Caban, the father had a nurturing relationship
with his biological children since their births.'50 Hence, the Court dis-
tinguished those cases where the father developed no parental ties to
the children from the father in Caban by stating that "where the fa-
ther never has come forward to participate in the rearing of his child,
nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the State from with-
holding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that
child."'' Once again, the Court places the child's best interest before
the supremacy of the Constitution.
Similarly, the best interests of the child have outweighed objec-
tions raised by parents under a due process examination as well.' 52 In
Lehr v. Robertson,15 the Court held that the presence of a biological
relationship alone does not necessarily confer upon the biological par-
ents the full range of parental rights.154 In that case, Petitioner Lehr
did not have any relationship with his biological daughter since her
birth, and did not support her financially.'5 5 Lehr also failed to regis-
ter with a "putative father" registry established by New York's De-
partment of Social Services,' 56 which would give notice to registered
putative fathers of adoption proceedings for their biological chil-
dren.' 57 In upholding the adoption order, the Court found that the
state had not violated the father's rights under the Due Process
Clause.' 58 The Court noted that if the biological father fails to take
some responsibility for his child's future by establishing a parent-child
relationship, the "Federal Constitution will not automatically compel
a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests
lie." 5 9 Here, as in the previously mentioned cases, the Supreme
Court has found that constitutional rights will be enforced only to the
extent that they dovetail with the best interests of the child.
With respect to the established forms of ART, as each new tech-
nology emerges, another layer of constitutional concern falls upon the
148. See id.
149. See id. at 392.
150. See id. at 382.
151. Id. at 392.
152. See generally U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. .
153. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
154. See id. at 261.
155. See id. at 252.
156. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 372-c (McKinney 1992).
157. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251-52 n.5.
158. See id. at 265.
159. Id. at 262.
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stage of reproductive technology. Beginning with artificial insemina-
tion, the major issues raised were the constitutional right to privacy
and, consequently, right to procreate. Then, as in vitro fertilization
was added to the reproductive toolbox, constitutional interests ex-
panded to encompass the use of the Commerce Clause as a regulatory
device. Finally, as surrogacy agreements have become a reproductive
technique of last resort, we find the unique situation in which the
child's best interests are often prioritized over secondary constitu-
tional questions.
B. Constitutional Implications of Cloning
In the debate over whether cloning of human beings should be
permitted by law, legislators, doctors, and citizens have all weighed
in. 6' While President Clinton has expressed his position by urging
Congress to ban human cloning, 161 experts on law and medicine have
stated that there will be challenges in the courts as soon as the govern-
ment attempts to control human cloning research. 62 A federal ban on
cloning could potentially face several constitutional challenges. By
exploring such potential challenges, one can better understand the fu-
ture of human cloning.
1. Right to Privacy
First, like AI, IVF, and surrogacy, cloning of humans involves the
right to procreate. Couples wanting children could use SCNT cloning
technology to have a child and to create a family. Hence, the right to
procreate established by case law in the Supreme Court163 could theo-
retically protect a couple's right to have a child via human cloning.
Yet, those who oppose cloning claim that it is not reproduction, but
replication, and "represents a difference in kind[,] not in degree[,] in
the manner in which human beings reproduce.' 64 Those against clon-
ing state that IVF is an improper analogy for cloning because IVF still
involves the union of an egg and a sperm.1 65 They argue that cloning,
on the other hand, does not follow the traditional union of an egg and
sperm to create an embryo, but instead copies another human being,
leaving the analogy to IVF entirely inappropriate.166 Thus, even as-
suming arguendo a constitutional and fundamental right to procreate
160. See Edwin Chen, Clinton Urges Law on Cloning, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 11, 1998, at
Al; Scientist Says He Plans to Clone Human, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 7, 1998, at A2. See gener-
ally GREGORY E. PENCE, WHO'S AFRAID OF HuMArN CLONING? (1998).
161. See Chen, supra note 160, at Al.
162. See Lavelle, supra note 6, at A14.
163. See supra notes 88-111 and accompanying text.
164. Scientific Discoveries and Cloning, supra note 11.
165. See id.
166. See id.
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exists, there remains the question of whether that right extends to the
right to replicate via cloning. Granted that the end desire of produc-
ing a child is the same through cloning or other ART, the constitu-
tional right to procreate can logically extend to human cloning.
Even if a person has a right to human cloning, that right may be
infringed upon if that infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest. 167 The most likely arguments offered as
state interests would be the protection of human life, psychological
and physical harms, and morality.
68
2. Commerce Clause
Second, a federal ban on cloning might be challenged under the
Interstate Commerce Clause.' 69 The most recent judicial expression
of the Commerce Clause doctrine states that Congress may regulate
under its commerce power in the following three areas: (1) "channels
of interstate commerce"; (2) "instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce"; and (3) "activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce."' 7 ° It is this third category of regulation that may be in-
voked if federal legislators attempt to pass a law limiting human
cloning.
Historically, the Court has interpreted Congressional commerce
power broadly. Hence, the Court does not second-guess Congress'
legislative motives as long as they are constitutionally valid.17 ' Conse-
quently, any serious challenge to a federal law banning cloning must
present a strong case showing that human cloning does not have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Given that couples travel
to other states to benefit from established ART 72 and that ART can
be expensive to utilize, this may be difficult to prove. Thus, regula-
tion of ART (including cloning) could proceed under the Commerce
Clause; any further limitations on cloning would need to be guided by
legal and ethical considerations.
167. See Debra L. Moore, Comment, Don't Rush to Judgment on "Dolly": Human
Cloning and Its Individual Procreative Liberty Implications, 66 U. Mo. KAN. CrrY L. REv.
425, 436 (1997).
168. See id. at 436-42. As discussed in Part III. C, many of these arguments are based
upon a fear of highly speculative events, which can be remedied by the appropriate legisla-
tive framework.
169. See Lavelle, supra note 6, at A14 (quoting R. Alto Charo, member of the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission).
170. U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629-30 (1995).
171. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (holding that Congress' power to reg-
ulate interstate commerce is plenary and absolute, subject only to the limitations imposed
by the Constitution).
172. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
173. See supra note 134.
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3. Takings Clause
Third, a new direction in ART might allow for challenging federal
cloning legislation as a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 174 The
Fifth Amendment provides that "private property [shall not] be taken
for public use, without just compensation."'17 5 Thus, the Fifth Amend-
ment's relevance to cloning turns upon whether a person's clone rep-
resents genetic private property or an actual person. For if a clone is
not private property, then a Fifth Amendment challenge would be
moot.
a. Personhood v. Property
The personhood-property dichotomy has been addressed in the
context of IVF.' 76 The perspectives on this dichotomy are divided
into three classifications. In the first category, proponents of the per-
sonhood view the claim that an embryo is alive because it is composed
of living cells that have the elements necessary for a potential human
life. 177 Accordingly, because embryos are considered human life, laws
applied to embryos born alive are appropriate, and embryos are thus
legally deemed children.' 7 8  Hence, embryos would be treated as
human beings for the purposes of a custody battle, under the best in-
terests of the child doctrine.' 7 9 The perspective that an embryo has
individual legal rights is, however, inconsistent with constitutional ju-
risprudence. 80 In Roe v. Wade,'' for instance, the Supreme Court
held that the "unborn" are not covered by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protections guaranteed each "person."' 82 Thus, the Court's re-
fusal to declare personhood prior to birth supports the position that
an embryo is not a legal "person."
The second category is composed of those who propose that an
embryo is property. This position claims that an embryo is the per-
174. See Lavelle, supra note 6, at A14 (quoting R. Alto Charo, member of National
Bioethics Advisory Commission).
175. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
176. See Kristine E. Luongo, Comment, The Big Chill: Davis v. Davis and the Protec-
tion of "Potential Life"?, 29 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1011, 1017-24 (1995).
177. See Schaefer, supra note 86, at 94.
178. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
179. See BLACK'S LAW DIcrioNARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that in child custody
determinations, the state acts as "parens patrix" to protect the interests of the child).
180. See Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod, The Human Preembryo, the Progeni-
tors, and the State: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Status, Rights, and Research Policy, 5
HIGH TECH. L.J. 257, 272 (1990). The cited article utilizes the term "preembryo" to refer
to an embryo from the one-cell stage through the formation of the major body systems.
See id. at 258. For the purposes of this Note's constitutional analysis, the use of "preem-
bryo" is interchangeable with "embryo" because both refer to the period after fertilization.
181. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
182. See id. at 158.
sonal property of the intended parents because they supplied the egg
and the sperm. 18 3 Therefore, parents are the owners of the embryo
and thus retain the power, superior to any third party, to make deci-
sions with respect to their embryo." 4 There is however one caveat:
the embryo "may [not] be treated in all respects like other property.
Rather, the term[ ] merely designate[s] who has authority to decide
whether legally available options with early embryos will oc-
cur....,, 85 With this qualification, defining an embryo as property is
more logical than personhood because it accounts for both the physi-
cal contributions of the parents and the basic individual integrity of
the embryo.
Finally, proponents of the third category propose a middle
ground between the first two approaches suggesting that an embryo,
although not a "person," is worthy of a special form of respect.8 6 The
American Fertility Society adopts this approach which suggests that
an embryo deserves greater respect than other tissue because it has
the potential of becoming a human being, but should not be recog-
nized as a person because it has not yet developed all the features of
personhood. 187 Thus, under this view, the degree of embryo protec-
tion should increase with each stage of development. 8 8 Nonetheless,
the primary decision-making authority still remains with the persons
who provided the egg and the sperm.'8 9 If there is specific legislation
indicating otherwise, this primary decision-making authority would be
overruled. 9° While this view may be appealing because it accounts
for parental and state interests, 191 it remains problematic because it
never defines what "special respect" to embryos necessarily entails.' 92
Nonetheless, one need not determine which definition offers a
perfect fit for the purposes of the takings analysis. This Note uses the
personhood-property debate to draw two conclusions: (1) that the
classification of an embryo as a person is inappropriate because of
constitutional case law to the contrary; and (2) both the classification
of an embryo as property and interim status indicate that the gamete
183. See Clifton Perry & L. Kristen Schneider, Cryopreserved Embryos: Who Shall De-
cide Their Fate?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 463, 480 (1992).
184. See Martin & Lagod, supra note 180, at 267-68.
185. John A. Robertson, Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Rights: In the Be-
ginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REv. 437, 454-55 (1990).
186. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596; Perry & Schneider, supra note 183, at 486.
187. See Ethics Committee of The American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of
the New Reproductive Technology, 53 FERnrLrnY & STEruirnY 60S (Supp. 2 June 1986).
188. See Stanford P. Berenbaum, Davis v. Davis: Frozen Embryos and the Thawing of
Procreative Liberties, 36 WAYNE L. REv. 1337, 1349 (1990).
189. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
190. See id. (internal citation omitted).
191. See Schaefer, supra note 86, at 97.
192. See Robertson, supra note 185, at 449.
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providers have decision-making authority concerning the embryos,
which is a key characteristic of the property classification.
b. Clone Analogy for Takings Analysis
Assuming that an embryo is property, two issues still remain:
whether a clone is analogous to an embryo for a takings analysis and if
so, whether a federal ban on cloning would constitute a taking. Some
may not consider a clone similar to an embryo because it lacks the
genetic contribution of two separate individuals. On the other hand,
one can argue that the presence of genetic material which, at some
time prior, originated from the union of an egg and sperm, is sufficient
for a clone-embryo analogy. In either case, the arguments will be
hard-fought because of their possible implications. Indeed, if a clone
is comparable to an embryo and an embryo is personal property, then
a clone is deemed property and thus legislation preventing a clone
from existing may be a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 193
The main thrust of the takings analysis is whether the applicable
law is a taking, for which just compensation must be paid, or merely a
regulation, for which no compensation is necessary. Most takings doc-
trine application has centered upon land use regulation in which the
relevant doctrinal inquiry is whether the regulation "substantially ad-
vance[s] legitimate state interests" and whether it "denies an owner
economically viable use of [the] land."' 94 If the regulation in question
either does not "substantially advance" a state's legitimate interest, or
denies economically viable land use to the owner, a taking occurs.
195
Without any case law focused upon the nexus between the takings
clause and assisted reproductive technologies, those challenging clon-
ing legislation on takings grounds would need to utilize this two-prong
test, the only available articulation of the takings doctrine. Doing so
requires the analysis to move one level up in generality, from the legal
technicalities of a clone-property analogy to the larger concept of pub-
lic policy concerns.
Under the first prong of the test, the federal government might
argue that the state's public policy interest militates against allowing
human cloning for fear of treating human beings as commodities.
196
Furthermore, manufacturing people "made to order undermines
human dignity and individuality."'1 97 As a counter, opponents of legis-
lation may argue that cloning meets important reproductive needs,
193. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V, cl. 4.
194. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
195. See id.
196. See Annas, supra note 7, at 80.
197. Id.
much like other reproductive technologies do. 198 This being so, it is
possible that the relevant inquiry with respect to cloning should focus
on whether cloning differs so much from other ART so as to require
"different legal or policy treatment."'19 9 This examination, however,
places the burden on the government to provide a valid reason for
why banning human cloning would substantially advance a state inter-
est. With the current state of research and knowledge at a basic level,
a legitimate basis for a complete ban on cloning is lacking.
Under the second prong, trying to relate economic use of land to
economic use of a clone may be attenuated and appalling. Parties on
both sides of the issue may well concede that trying to quantify a
human clone in financial terms is repulsive to the human conscience.
The ill-fit between potential cloning legislation and current takings
doctrine indicate that the proponents and opponents may need to find
a middle ground in pursuing this type of constitutional analysis.
4. Right of Scientific Inquiry
A fourth constitutional concern would consider whether a ban on
cloning would infringe upon a constitutional right of scientific in-
quiry." Although not explicitly enumerated, such a right would
likely stem from the First Amendment's right to free speech and the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of personal liberty.20 ' In fact, in
Griswold, the Court found that the "penumbra" of the right to free
speech includes the "freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and
freedom to teach. ' 20 2 In another instance, the Court drew an analogy
between the information function provided by the press and the same
function performed by academic researchers.2 0 3 Furthermore, the
Court has also stated that the personal liberty rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment necessarily involves the right to "acquire useful
knowledge.
' '2o
As the right of scientific inquiry stems from the fundamental
rights delineated in the First and Fourteenth Amendments, any regu-
lation of this right would appear to be subject to strict scrutiny analy-
198. See Ethics of Human Cloning: Testimony on "Ethics and Theology: A Continuation
of the National Discussion on Human Cloning" Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and
Safety of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 1997 WL 11233882, at *1
[hereinafter Ethics and Theology] (testimony of John A. Robertson, Vinson & Elkins
Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law).
199. Id.
200. See Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans
on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 661 (1998).
201. See id.
202. 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
203. See Andrews, supra note 200, at 662 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705
(1972)).
204. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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sis. However, as mentioned before, a compelling state interest in this
area would be quite difficult to prove.2 °5 Moreover, under a constitu-
tional rubric, the right to clone may be more appropriately character-
ized under several other constitutional rights before being deemed to
fall within the First Amendment right to scientific inquiry. Thus, if
this is the only basis left upon which to argue for a right to clone, it
may militate against a court determining that such a right exists. Nev-
ertheless, when combined with the more salient interests under a right
to privacy, the right to scientific inquiry becomes yet another reason
against a federal ban of human cloning.
C. Some Ethical Considerations of Cloning
Any analysis of cloning could not be complete without reference
to the ethical concerns raised by the application of this technology.
Proponents and opponents have contributed to the colloquy by de-
picting both the potential harms and benefits of human cloning. Care-
ful analysis and explanation of these arguments provides a good
backdrop for the issues surrounding cloning and allows for an in-
formed decision on the permissibility of cloning.
1. Harms of Cloning
a. Harms to the Child
The cloning debate gives greatest attention to the potential ef-
fects of the technology upon children. Some have sought to ban clon-
ing in the interest of preventing physical harm to the child, namely in
an effort to prevent disease or deformities.2 °6 Such physical harms
may occur if cloning is attempted without adequate scientific knowl-
edge. The premature use of this technology is a possibility when phy-
sicians place their desire to implement innovative procedures above
their duty to promote health.2"7 Alternatively, the hasty application
of cloning may also occur at the prodding of an over-eager patient.
2 0 8
Proponents of cloning counter by stating that regulatory proce-
dures are in place to assure the safety of new procedures. 20 9 Even
without formal procedural hurdles, the medical profession is under a
covenant to "do no harm," which should render any careless or swift
decision to clone less probable. Furthermore, proponents still admit
that much more research is needed before human cloning is safe and
205. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
206. See Note, Human Cloning and Substantive Due Process, 111 HARv. L. REv. 2348,
2362 (1998) [hereinafter Human Cloning].




effective"' ° In fact, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
("NBAC"), which convened at the request of President Bill Clinton
immediately after the announcement of Dolly,2"' found that the only
rationale which ethically justified a public policy of restraint was one
which focused upon preventing physical harm to children.2 1 2
Beyond physical harm, commentators contend that a clone will
suffer psychological harm as well. They claim that a clone will lack a
personal identity and individuality.2 13 This argument supposes that a
unique genome is necessary to a sense of individuality.214 (This claim
stops short of asserting that identical genes will make the clone and
clonee destined to live identical lives.) Other opponents add that this
genetic congruence will force the clone to not be viewed as truly sepa-
rate by himself or herself or others. 1 5 Thus, the clone may experience
implicit or explicit pressure to follow in the footsteps of his or her
"clonee", the person from whom he or she is cloned. Another argu-
ment goes further to claim that creating a clone relegates that person
to a realm normally reserved for subhuman things, treating the person
as "wholly subject to our will."1
2 1 6
Those in support of cloning respond by stating that the psycho-
logical harms are "completely speculative." '17 They point to the exist-
ence of identical twins as persons with the exact same genotype who
have no problem leading separate and significant lives.2 18 Further-
more, they refer to the "nature versus nurture" philosophy to claim
that genotype is not determinative of the phenotype given differing
environmental factors.219 Practically speaking, cloning does not yield
a duplicate of the adult, but an infant, 20 making it even less plausible
for the clone and clonee to have identical life experiences. Also, for
210. See id. at 1411.
211. See The Clone Age, supra note 44, at 68. The first molecular studies conducted on
Dolly yielded preliminary evidence that clones may inherent not only the genes, but some
aspects of the age of the animals from which they are cloned. See Sheep Clone Was Born
Old, Study Finds, S.F. CHRON., May 27, 1999, at Al. Thus, clones could have shorter life
spans and greater disease susceptibility at younger ages than their clonee-parents. See id.
212. See R. Alta Charo, Cloning: Ethics and Public Policy, in HUMAN CLONIrG: Sci-
ENCE, ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (Barbara MacKinnon ed., forthcoming 1999).
213. See Human Cloning, supra note 206, at 2363.
214. See Robertson, supra note 207, at 1412.
215. See id. at 1413.
216. J.L.A. Garcia, Human Cloning: Never and Why Not, in HuMAN CLOImNG: Sci-
ENCE, ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (Barbara MacKinnon ed., forthcoming 1999) [hereinaf-
ter Garcia, Human Cloning].
217. Human Cloning, supra note 206, at 2363.
218. See id.
219. See Robertson, supra note 207, at 1414.
220. See Bonnie Steinbock, Cloning Human Beings: Sorting Through the Ethical Issues,
in HuNtAN CLONING: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (Barbara MacKinnon ed.,
forthcoming 1999) [hereinafter Steinbock, Cloning Human Beings].
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those who fear that cloning creates pressure on the clone to repeat the
clonee's life and thereby violates a child's right to an open future,
cloning proponents claim that one's genes do not determine who one
is or will be because one becomes a self by making a multitude of
choices. 21 Thus, it is entirely possible for two persons with the same
genetic makeup to lead different and unique lives.
b. Harms to the Family
Clearly, harms to the child can transform into harms to the fam-
ily, given the integration of individuals in a collective family unit.
Nonetheless, scholars have broadened the debate to cover the poten-
tial impact cloning may have on the family as a whole.
Those in opposition to cloning may claim that the state has an
interest in protecting existing family structures. 222 Of course, the cyni-
cal counterpoint is to ask, "what exactly is the American family struc-
ture?" It is obviously not the typical "Donna Reed" nuclear family of
yesteryear. A stronger argument, however, is the concern that cloning
may lead to confusion in family lineage and kinship. 22 A basic effect
of this confusion would be the identification of family members for
the purposes of effectuating probate law. For example, if a parent
clones himself or herself, the clone may be the social child of the
clonee, but also his or her genetic twin and sibling, and the genetic
child of the clonee's parents. Thus, if the clonee passes away without
a valid will, then probate law must determine if the clone is a child or
sibling for the purposes of intestate succession. Similarly, if the
clonee's parents die intestate, the law must determine if the clone is
their child as well. Also, for instance, if a couple clones an unrelated
person and that clonee dies, the question then becomes whether the
clone will take a share of the clonee's estate as a sibling. In any case, a
specific will identifying the names of interested parties would likely
help in solving the problem. Nonetheless, because probate law gov-
erns those dying intestate and also places limitations on valid wills, the
legal appellations ascribed to persons in the cloning context are essen-
tial in the facilitation of probate law.224
221. See id.
222. See Human Cloning, supra note 206, at 2363.
223. See NATIONAL BioErmcs ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: RE-
PORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION 70
(1997).
224. An additional, but less pervasive, impact would be disruption of the current foren-
sic DNA identification system. See The Clone Age, supra note 44, at 71. Given the fact
that DNA matches are used as physical evidence and each person's genetic composition is
unique, the appearance of clones with identical genetic stamps might cast reasonable doubt
upon a defendant's guilt.
The more substantial harm to the family, though, stems from the
confusion of familial titles, and consequently, familial roles that may
result from cloning. In order to understand this problem, some scien-
tific background is necessary. A portion of a person's DNA is found
in the mitochondria in the egg's cytoplasm, outside the egg's nu-
cleus.2" Thus, the woman providing the donor egg, into which DNA
from the clonee will be transferred, is contributing a small portion of
the total DNA for the clone-child.226 As a result, the female genetic
contribution in cloning is composed of two different portions, mito-
chondrial DNA and nuclear DNA, as opposed to sexual reproduction
in which the same woman provides both female DNA sources.2 2 7
This reveals the possibility of a third biological mother, separate
from the separate genetic and gestational mothers made possible by in
vitro fertilization. 2 s The question then becomes what, if any, legal or
social rights does the donor of the enucleated egg have? Scientifically
speaking, the enucleated egg donor provides some, however small,
portion of DNA that contributes to the clone's genome; and as such,
can be considered a "mother" in that sense. On the other hand, hav-
ing established that genetics do not absolutely determine a child's life
and that the child's environment does affect his or her eventual iden-
tity, one might argue that the mother who rears the child has the
greatest impact of all and should be deemed the only "mother." Ac-
cordingly, the social mother could be named the legal mother, similar
to an adoptive mother. In fact, there would be even less concern over
who the mother was if the donor of the nucleus and enucleated egg
were the same woman.229
These kinship concerns play out in differing degrees depending
upon who is being cloned. If a couple decides to clone an existing
child, assuming their parenting roles are sufficiently defined with re-
spect to the clonee-child, they will be in the identical parenting posi-
tion vis-A-vis the new clone-child." 0 Certainly, the peculiarity is that
there will be two siblings with the same genome, but different ages."
225. See Robertson, supra note 207, at 1423.
226. See id.
227. See id. Mitochondrial DNA contributes only one chromosome to the full comple-
ment of human chromosomes. See MIcRosoFr ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA (1999). How-
ever, only eggs-not sperm-contribute mitochondrial DNA to the resulting embryo. See
id. It replicates in the same way as nucleic DNA and directs the production of proteins,
which function as enzymes. See id Mitochondrial DNA has been linked to the genes for
diabetes and deafness. See id.
228. See Robertson, supra note 207, at 1423.
229. See id. at 1423-24.
230. Although human cloning may presumably be sought by a single person, for pur-
poses of discussion I will assume a child-rearing environment consisting of a two-person
relationship.
231. See Robertson, supra note 207, at 1424.
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However, the second will be raised at a different time, in a different
environment, thereby promoting the latter child's individuality and
uniqueness from the clonee. 32
If a couple clones an unrelated third party, the couple will rear
and the female partner will gestate the clone 33 Hence, the couple
will take the positions of gestational and social, but not genetic, par-
ents. Any family lineage or kinship concerns would be similar to
those of IVF, in which it is possible to gestate a child that bears no
genetic relation to either person in the couple. Thus, to the extent
that IVF without genetic connection is permissible, so would clon-
ing.234 Furthermore, the gestational and rearing relationship is argua-
bly more significant than the genetic relationship 5 because of the
sheer time commitment and physical presence in the life of the child.
However, in the context of cloning, there remains the issue of the
genetic parents of the cloned person.3 6 This suggests a concern for
the genetic parents because they will have a delayed twin of their ex-
isting adult child.237 Thus, this invokes the issue of consent, where if a
parent does not desire to have a delayed twin, but the clonee consents,
the clone will be born into an environment in which the desirability of
his or her presence is in dispute. Even though the social parents may
have no intention of having any sort of relationship with the genetic
parents or the clonee, any knowledge the clone eventually receives of
this may impact his or her psychological health, as well as the integrity
of the clone's social family.
If a couple decides to clone one of the members of the couple,
kinship titles begin to blur. Primarily, this stems from the clonee's
position as both genetic sibling and social parent to the clone.238 As
mentioned before, there would be concern if the parent creates expec-
tations of the child to develop in a certain way based upon comparison
to the parent's upbringing. This problem is symptomatic of a larger
kinship issue in which the parent is unable to separate his or her role
as the parent from that of the genetic clonee.239 If unchecked, this
would wreak havoc upon the family structure by confusing the psy-
chological and social status of each individual in that family. In addi-
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. Of course, the ultimate question remains regarding the permissibility of in vitro
fertilization. However, as of 1998, IVF has been utilized without constitutional challenges.
See Heidi Forster & Emily Ramsey, Legal Responses to the Potential Cloning of Human
Beings, 32 VAL. U.L. REv. 433, 459 (1998).
235. See Robertson, supra note 207 at 1425.
236. See id.
237. See il-
238. See id. at 1426.
239. See id.
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tion, the consent issue arises again because now the clonee's genetic
parents have another child, whether wanted or not. Their status be-
comes those of genetic parents as well as social grandparents.24 ° A
similar disorientation might occur if the couple cloned one of their
parents, thereby rendering the clone a genetic parent of the person
raising him or her.24'
Regardless of which person is being cloned, the key factor in de-
termining the status of the relationship is social rearing. For example,
if a woman takes on the social role as a mother, her child will psycho-
logically behave like her child, whether or not that clone-child's genes
came from the rearing mother or father, the genetic offspring of the
rearing mother and father, or a third party. In order to ensure the
parenting roles are carried out as intended, the potential parents
might go through advance counseling.242 Moreover, cloning service
providers could also employ advance screening of potential parents to
ensure familial stability and to discern whether the intent of the par-
ties is to rear a child (or engage in some impermissible purpose).243
Whatever family lineage problems arise, they can likely be dealt with
by legal change and social and behavioral adjustments such that a to-
tal prohibition of cloning would not be warranted.
c. Abuses of Technology
Another negative effect stemming from human cloning could be
the abuse of that technology. One form of this abuse can be broadly
categorized as fears from the science fiction realm. Several sources
have provided the stories for such fears. A famous example is Aldous
Huxley's Brave New World,244 in which the "Bokanovsky Process" di-
vides a single embryo into ninety-six identical copies.2 45 These em-
bryos are gestated under identical conditions to yield five classes of
hierarchical workers, named simply, Alphas, Betas, Deltas, Gammas,
and Epsilons.246 Some groups were conditioned to love performing
specified tasks.247 Another unsettling example came from David
Rorvik and his allegedly true account of the cloning of a wealthy
bachelor. 48 While most of the scientific response centered upon
240. See id. at 1427.
241. See id. at 1428.
242. See id. at 1429.
243. This determination would also encompass other, if any, purposes declared permis-
sible uses of cloning by the legislature.
244. See ALDOuS HUXLEY, BRAvE NEw WORLD (1932).
245. See George J. Annas, Human Cloning: A Choice or an Echo?, 32 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 247, 255 (1998).
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See DAVID M. RORViK, IN HIS IMAGE: TEr CLONING OF A MAN (1978).
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proving Rorvik's story false, scientists also argued against any laws
that might affect research in this area.249 Leading to even greater fear
is The Boys from Brazil by Ira Levin.5 In that novel, a character
named Mengele creates ninety-four clones of Adolf Hitler.251 As the
story develops, however, the reader learns a valuable lesson from a
Nazi-hunter, who realizes that the true issue in creating another Hitler
is not genetics, but human values.252
Applied to our present situation, these fears have become articu-
lated as, first, a fear of exploiting clones who are explicitly created for
their low intelligence and ability to do boring and low-paying work. 53
Or, in the same vein, a fear of a mass of easily-controlled clones, who
are subject to a tyrannical leader and a mob mentality. Second, in the
opposite direction, there is a fear of eugenics2 4 producing individuals
with certain genetic traits to create a superior group of people. The
harm from the first group of "less intelligent" clones-oppression of
human beings-is not as clear as the harm from the latter. Histori-
cally, the fear of eugenics derives from its dubious origins in those
holding racist and classist beliefs which attempt to ferret out of society
non-whites or the mentally or physically disabled . 5 5 More recently,
eugenics has shed some of these motives and become a technology
driven to improve the health of those potentially subject to genetic
disease- 5 6 For instance, eugenics has combined genetic testing and
gene therapy to prevent lethal genetic diseases such as Tay Sachs,
Lesch Nyhan, and Huntington's disease.25 7 Although these motives
are honorable, one may still find fault with eugenics simply because
science is interfering in areas traditionally left to nature. Nonetheless,
science interferes with nature each time doctors intervene in the birth
of a child or a patient is prescribed antibiotics. In that sense, eugenic
treatment is only a difference in the degree of interference. The true
question is whether as a society, we are comfortable with, or capable
of, circumscribing the limits of science.
On the balance, science fiction has provided numerous examples
of technology gone wrong. It is important, however, to remember that
249. See Annas, supra note 245, at 252. In fact, one scientist stated, "[t]here is no need
for any form of regulatory legislation, and it could only in the long run have a harmful
effect." Id. (citing Developments in Cell Biology and Genetics: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 95th Cong. 95-105 (1978)).
250. See IRA LnviN, THE Boys FROM BAzIL (1976).
251. See Annas, supra note 245, at 255.
252. See id.





such works are only fiction. They are the imaginings of a system in
which all the checks and obstacles preventing abuse have failed.
Nonetheless, while they are not reality, they provide useful instruction
about how not to proceed, about how science can ensure that cloning
technology is acceptable to society. Additionally, these works also
provide hope that regardless of the ability to manipulate science or
nature, the human element can always have a role in changing any
prefabricated destiny.
A second category of abuse is classified as "lack of consent." Tra-
ditionally, any medical procedure requires the consent of the pa-
tient." Our notions of autonomy require the permission of the
person or persons who will be directly affected by the medical proce-
dure. Although consent is usually required because of potential physi-
cal risk, the general standard of informed consent requires disclosure
of all material risks that would likely affect a reasonable patient's de-
cision. 5 9 The clonee is directly affected because he or she is being
cloned, and it is likely that the risk and knowledge of having a later-
born identical twin (assuming the clonee is a single-born child) is ma-
terial to the "reasonable" clonee. Therefore, somatic cell nuclear
transfer cloning would require the consent of the person who is the
DNA source.26 Yet, it is possible to retrieve DNA without the source
knowing, from DNA shed on doorknobs, utensils, hair, or other com-
mon objects touched by the person;261 also known as surreptitious
cloning.262 In those circumstances, consent may be difficult to acquire.
This difficulty leads to questions of whether consent would be re-
quired in the cases of cloning a deceased person or a child.26 3 Because
of the desire to avoid these confusing and various permutations, clon-
ing regulation (if cloning is permitted) should ideally limit cloning to
situations in which the DNA is taken directly and with the explicit
consent of the donor source.
If consent is required by the person who will be affected by the
procedure, one may logically ask whether the clone source's parents
must also consent.264 The rationale being that the cloning process
would essentially create a delayed identical twin of one of their chil-
dren,265 a product of their genes. A dichotomy occurs because the
258. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (holding
that a patient, in consenting to a splenectomy, did not give his informed consent to having
cell and blood samples taken for the physician's own scientific research).
259. See Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1979).
260. See Robertson, supra note 207, at 1446.
261. See id.
262. See Human Cloning, supra note 206, at 2364.
263. See Robertson, supra note 207, at 1446-48.
264. See id. at 1448.
265. See id.
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genetic parents are the societal grandparents. While parents of a child
have the right to decide to reproduce or not, grandparents generally
cannot decide whether they will become grandparents or not.266 If the
potential parents intend to raise their clone-child in a traditional social
environment with their parents behaving as social grandparents, then
the clone source's parents should not have to agree. For all societal
purposes, the clone-child will grow up entirely different from the
clonee because of a dissimilar gestational and rearing environment.
Because the genes are not determinative of a person's outcome, the
clone-child would not be identical to the clonee and therefore, would
effectively not be the social grandparents' child.
One scholar would go so far as to require the consent of the per-
son who is being experimented upon, the clone.267 While agreed that
it is impossible to receive consent to the procedure from the person
who is sought to be brought into existence by the procedure, this
scholar thus concludes that cloning is absolutely impermissible. 261 In
other words, because consent is required, but impossible to acquire,
the inquiry into cloning should stop there. However, the fallacy in this
argument is that consent has never been required of the child sought
to be produced. Although it is impossible to ask a child of coital re-
production or in vitro fertilization to consent to being born, society
has not deemed this a barrier to these types of reproduction. Simi-
larly, cloning cannot and should not require the consent of the child in
order to be performed.
d. Harms to Society
Human cloning technology also has the potential to impact larger
societal interests as well. Such public policy issues stem from a con-
cern that the legalization and social acceptance of human cloning
could lead to society embracing certain values. It is the fear of such
values that leads to this discussion.
First, a basic concern with cloning is that scientists are interfering
with nature.269 Of course, the assumption is that such interference is
inherently evil. However, at least one scholar has noted that a similar
objection applies to in vitro fertilization, based upon the issue of artifi-
ciality or naturalness of such assisted reproduction.27 ° While IVF and
other assisted reproductive technologies have not been explicitly con-
doned by the law, society as a whole has at least acquiesced in its
application; thereby, expressing tacit approval. If approval of IVF
266. See id.
267. See Garcia, Human Cloning, supra note 216.
268. See id.
269. See Pimple, supra note 1, at 729.
270. See id.
may be viewed as accepting a certain degree of human intervention
with nature, this logic would apply to cloning with the same force be-
cause the basic end result-creating a child-is identical. Indeed, our
society has "allow[ed] technological interventions in just about every
aspect of life ... ."271
Still, a second public policy concern is reflected by religious ob-
jections.2 72 On an abstract non-denominational level, some have ob-
jected to human cloning because it challenges our transcendence,
which is allegedly key to the essence of being human.27 In particular,
Leon Kass has stated that "[t]o lay one's hands on human generation
is to take a major step toward making man himself simply another one
of the man-made things."'274 Moreover, this loss of transcendence
would result from cloning because cloning dehumanizes reproduction
and "temper[s] our sense of wonder at creation . "..."275
Furthermore, examining objections from established religions,
one reaches the heart of the religious debate. As evidenced by the
NBAC soliciting religious input in determining recommendations for
federal cloning policy, informed public discourse on cloning necessar-
ily involves the fundamental religious values integrated into research
on the beginning of life. 76 As one can guess, early discussion of
human cloning revealed that religious groups believed human cloning
to be unacceptable. For example, a Methodist theologian, Paul Ram-
sey, suggested that human cloning is the border demarcating the line
between medicine and society.27 7 He believed that crossing such a
line would jeopardize human dignity and the meaning of procrea-
tion. Also, the Roman Catholic Church has rejected human clon-
ing. In 1987, the Vatican released an encyclical called Donum Vitae
(Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dig-
nity of Procreation) which stated a moral opposition to reproductive
technologies that severed procreation and sexuality.27 9 These imper-
271. IL
272. Although this area is usually thought to cover only established religion, it is possi-
ble to think of such concerns under the larger category of spirituality, which even atheists
and agnostics may concede is pivotal to an understanding of human dignity. See Kevin P.
Quinn, Human Cloning After Dolly: What Sort of Creatures Might We Become?, 38
JuRmirmTmcs J. 91, 94 (1997).
273. See id. at 95.
274. IL (citing Leon R. Kass, Making Babies-The New Biology and the "Old" Moral-
ity, 26 Pun. IN-EREST 18, 49 (1972) (emphasis omitted)).
275. Id.
276. See Courtney S. Campbell, Religious, Philosophical and Ethical Perspectives on
Cloning: Resistance and Meaning: Religious Communities and Human Cloning, 32 VAL.
U.L. REv. 607, 607 (1998).
277. See id. at 609.
278. See id.
279. See id. at 612.
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missible reproductive technologies included human cloning, surro-
gacy, in vitro fertilization, donor insemination, and experimentation
on embryos created via in vitro fertilization. 80 According to the Ro-
man Catholic Church, any assisted reproductive technique is beyond
the marriage sacrament."8 '
While such objections have seemed to dominate the religious dis-
cussion, some theologians' concerns have not been so absolute. Jo-
seph Fletcher, an Episcopal theologian, advances human autonomy to
the extent that rational behavior should domesticate nature.28 2 There-
fore, in so controlling nature, Fletcher believes that human cloning is
just one of the many methods of reproduction that should be permit-
ted because of its overriding societal benefit.83 Jewish scholars have
historically been more moderate as well. While there is a religious
preference for coital reproduction, Jewish theologians admit that
some special circumstances may warrant human cloning as a method
of last resort.28 4 Such special circumstances include infertility or the
goal of lineage preservation.
2 85
Since the advent of Dolly, our religious pluralism has become evi-
dent as various religious representatives have reiterated past convic-
tions and declared greater latitude for human cloning.286 Roman
Catholics and conservative Protestants have repeated concerns about
the procreation-sexuality link and human dignity.8 7 However, other
Protestant commentary has allowed the idea of human technology im-
bued with divine creativity to justify human cloning in certain con-
texts.288 Islamic and Jewish theologians have similarly recognized
specific instances for permitting human cloning.8
Thus, although historically organized religions have renounced
human cloning altogether, some religious thinkers have considered
limited circumstances in which human cloning might be allowed. At
this point, it is difficult to determine how much this flexible approach
has permeated the religious community; but at least, this allows some
room for human cloning advocates to maneuver.
Third, ethicists have expressed concern that permitting human
cloning might impact how we perceive children. This has been ex-
280. See id.
281. See Allison M. Mays, Cloning: Now that We've Got It, What Do We Do With It?, 22
LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 287, 301 (1998).
282. See Campbell, supra note 276, at 609.
283. See id.
284. See id. at 611.
285. See id.




pressed as two interrelated concepts. The first of these concepts is the
fear that clone-children will lead to children being treated as mere
means to parental ends, instead of unique individuals worthy of being
ends in themselves.29 ° This fear of objectification also manifests itself
in the possibility that potential parents, seeking to have a clone with a
particular genome, will regard this child as a mechanism for accom-
plishing the goals motivating that genome selection.29' In this case, a
child might be seen only as the instrumentality for living out certain
goals, rather than a child with an open future. Taken to its furthest
extent, a couple with a dead or dying child may seek to replace that
child through SCNT cloning. The motive behind this use would be
questionable because of the fragile state of the grieving parents. On a
broader scale, this could lead to the devaluation of human life, dignity,
and identity.2 92
The second concept that is a logical consequence of objectifica-
tion is commodification. The theory is that as human cloning develops
and becomes more widespread, a market may develop for human cells
with particular genes. In the most strict market model, utilitarianism
would allow private demand for genes to act as an incentive to collect-
ing and cataloguing these various genetic traits. In turn, prices for
these genes could be set by a simple supply-and-demand mechanism.
The main criticism is that this practice would put a price on all human
characteristics, thereby commodifying the children with these
characteristics.
293
The objectification-commodification concerns are valid consider-
ations. However, if cloning becomes a practical and legal reality, they
can be combated. The government could simply prohibit the market-
ing of human genes, similar to the current prohibitions on the
purchase and sale of human organs or fetal tissues.2 9 4 Granted, en-
forcement might become an issue. However, those trafficking in "il-
licit" genes, not only would have to get the genetic traits illegally, but
would also need to find a physician to perform the procedure with
these illegal materials. In addition, the United States could also urge
the international political community to pass similar legislation. In-
deed, in January 1998, nineteen European countries signed a ban on
human cloning. 295 Furthermore, even if specific cloning practices
were illegal in the U.S. but legal elsewhere, it is difficult to argue that
the United States can be responsible for its citizens extraterritorially.
290. See Robertson, supra note 207, at 1418.
291. See id. at 1419.
292. See Annas, supra note 245, at 254.
293. See id. at 259.
294. See id. at 260.
295. See Forsythe, supra note 12, at 469.
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2. Benefits
The application of cloning technology has led to different reac-
tions depending on its intended use. There has been widespread sup-
port for continuing cloning research for use in cloning animals.
296
Such research on animals has been encouraged in the hopes of discov-
ering potential commercial and medical uses. 297 This sentiment is jus-
tified given humans' historical practice of creating, manipulating, and
destroying animals for our own use.298 Furthermore, even for those
who hold animals in high regard, animal manipulation may still be
permissible given an even higher regard for humans.
In contrast, the application of cloning to humans has met with
great opposition. 299 Those with science-fiction-type fears envision
human cloning utilized to create clones of Adolf Hitler or produce
massive armies of identical laborers.3°° Put to its best use, however,
human cloning could be used to assist infertile couples seeking to raise
a child.30 1 We must acknowledge that these potential benefits that
cloning offers to society do exist.
a. Treat Infertility
The most plausible application of cloning technology would be as
a possible remedy for infertility.302 The most straightforward method
of this treatment would involve the direct cloning of an adult using
somatic cell nuclear transfer. The DNA source could come from an
individual unrelated to the intended parent or parents. In which case,
the social parents would raise that clone-child under an arrangement
somewhat similar to adoption, with the added relationship of the wo-
man likely acting as the gestational mother. In another scenario, the
DNA source could be an individual who is genetically related to the
parents, whether a biological parent (of the intended parents) or a
cousin or even one of the parents who will raise the clone-child. Thus,
296. See Robertson, supra note 207, at 1382.
297. See id. In fact, shortly after Dolly was announced, Roslin Institute scientists re-
vealed the arrival of Polly, a sheep with a human gene which yields a human protein in its
milk. See A Clone Again: Sheep Has Additional Human Gene to Produce Human Protein,
MEALEY's LrrIG. REP.: BIOHCrNOLoGY, July 25, 1997, at 14. This resulting protein may
be given to persons lacking that protein, such as patients with bone disease or hemophilia.
See id.
298. See Robertson, supra note 207, at 1383.
299. See id. at 1382. See generally Annas, supra note 245.
300. See Annas, supra note 245, at 255.
301. See GINA KOLATA, CLONE: THE RoAD TO DOLLY, AND THE PATH AHEAD 14-15
(1998).
302. See Kathleen Sullivan, Scientists Ponder Ethics of Cloning Human Babies, S.F. Ex-
AMINER, Apr. 5, 1998, at C4.
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in this application, an infertile couple could raise a child to which they
are genetically related, which some couples would prefer.
Another method would utilize the cloning of embryos to increase
the number of viable embryos for use in in vitro fertilization." 3 This
would increase the number of opportunities for implantation of the
embryo and reduce the cost and physical burden of hyperstimulated
egg production and surgical egg retrieval." 4
Finally, cloning may be employed in which infertility is due to
insufficient gametes (ova or sperm).305 Usually, this type of infertility
is treated by seeking either donor sperm from a commercial sperm
bank or fertility clinic or donor eggs from paid sources or family mem-
bers.30 6 However, with the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer,
couples uncomfortable with the notion of using someone else's ga-
metes-and hence, DNA-can insert their own DNA.30 7 Thus, if
there is male infertility, the woman may provide just the egg (while
the man provides the DNA), the egg and DNA, or only the DNA, in
addition to gestating.08 With female infertility, the woman may ges-
tate and provide DNA30 9 or gestate an embryo with the man's DNA.
Regardless of why couples use cloning, they will be exercising a
greater measure of control than in any other form of reproduction.
With other assisted reproductive technologies, couples may be able to
manipulate only one-half of the child's genome at a time. That is, with
techniques such as AI or IVF, physicians separately determine the
source of ovum and sperm, but are unable to predict what resultant
genetic combination will form. Yet, with cloning, doctors would able
to know in advance the complete genome of the child because the
adult somatic cell donor is already living.
Necessarily, whether this degree of control is desirable is a ques-
tion left to public policy. In the meantime, there is at least one scien-
tist who already has plans to clone a human being. In December 1997,
Dr. G. Richard Seed announced his plans to go forth with this re-
search before Congress has an opportunity to ban the procedure.310
In fact, he even has four couples who have volunteered for this re-
search.31' He has also stated that if the United States prevents him
303. See Robertson, supra note 207, at 1378.
304. See id.





310. See Scientist Says He Plans to Clone Human, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 7, 1998, at A2.
Professor Severino Antinori, an Italian embryologist, has also stated a desire to clone
humans to let childless men have children. See Steve Connor, Professor Plans Cloned Ba-
bies for Childless Men, THs INDEP. (London), Oct. 26, 1998, at 6.
311. See Scientist Says He Plans to Clone Human, supra note 310, at A2.
SPRING 19991
780 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26:741
from conducting his work, he will go to Mexico.312 Then in December
1998, Dr. Seed announced that he intended to take his cloning opera-
tions to Japan instead.313 Furthermore, he stated that he had already
raised three quarters of the $20 million needed to establish these facil-
ities and to begin working in August 1999.31 4
While his determination is commendable, this is exactly the type
of overzealous behavior that casts grave doubt on the integrity of the
medical and scientific communities. In turn, it may lead to potential
legislation and legal action that will overestimate the need for con-
straints on these communities. Doctors and scientists as a group could
be hindered in doing beneficial research on cloning because of the
excessive behavior of a few, or only one. Only time will reveal
whether Dr. Seed will succeed in his endeavors.
b. Organ and Tissue Source
Another possible use for human cloning is to produce organs or
tissue for transplantation.315 This method would be preferred over
other forms of organ and tissue donation because it offers a finite pe-
riod of delay, lasting only as long as it takes to gestate the clone and
retrieve the necessary tissue or organ, as opposed to the indefinite
period on an organ donor waiting list. In addition, using a clone of the
intended recipient would reduce the chance of rejection.316 This re-
duction would occur as a result of the clone being an identical, but
delayed, twin of the recipient.317 As such, the clone would have the
same antigens and immune system,318 essentially allowing the recipi-
ent to receive his or her "own" organ or tissue.
There are, however, some commodification-objectification con-
cerns in creating a child simply to produce an organ or tissue donor.
For instance, suppose a couple's daughter suffered from leukemia and
anticipated needing a bone marrow transplant. The couple could
clone their own daughter so that the clone could provide a perfect
tissue match.319 This scenario could lead to situations in which a fam-
312. See id.
313. See Deborah Smith, Maverick Will Clone His Wife, SYDrEY MORNING HERALD,
Dec. 18, 1998, at 11, available in 1998 WL 2010661.
314. See id. However, in January 1999, Dr. Seed's plans were hindered when a subcom-
mittee of Japan's Council for Science and Technology recommended a human cloning ban
in Japan. See Japan Bans Seed From Setting Up Cloning Research Center, TRANSPLANT
NEws, Jan. 15, 1999.




319. The Ayala family did something similar for one of their children. Their eighteen-
year old daughter Anissa was in remission from leukemia. See id. at 1420. There was a
possibility that the disease would recur, requiring Anissa to have a bone marrow trans-
ily would freely clone a family member "just in case" a medical need
arose later for a tissue or organ donor; or a person might find a stran-
ger who is a match and pay that person to allow him or herself to be
cloned. Perhaps then, a more acceptable practice would be to allow
the clone only to develop to the blastocyst stage, then retrieve stem
cells prior to differentiation.320 If these stem cells could be stimulated
to differentiate into the necessary organ or tissue cells, then the stem
cells could provide the needed cells without having to gestate and rear
an actual child.32' This would avoid the potential problem of a child
eventually learning that he or she was not created out of a desire to
have a family, but only for harvesting cells. Indeed, this use of cloning
has been implicitly supported by the NBAC report, in which they did
not recommend stopping cloning research at the cellular level.322
c. Gene Therapy
The SCNT technique can also be used in animals and humans as a
form of gene therapy. Generally, the purpose is to create animals that
have had genes from other species added, called transgenic animals.323
Primarily, these animals have been altered through the addition of
human genes, with the hope that the transgenic animals become a
source of proteins and other pharmaceutical products for humans.324
Somatic cell nuclear transfer offers an improvement over transgenic
animals created through other means. The previous method involved
individually placing a human gene into each animal, a method that
was tedious and inefficient.3 1 SCNT, on the other hand, lets the sci-
entist place the human gene into an animal only once and then use the
DNA from that transgenic animal to yield as many clones as needed
for production.
326
Originally, the Wilmut study was conducted with this purpose in
mind.327 Moreover, in July 1997, the scientists at the Roslin Institute
announced the creation of the first sheep clones to contain human
plant. See id. Because no one in their immediate family was a tissue match, Mr. and Mrs.
Ayala decided to have another child so that it might be a suitable donor if needed. See id.
The couple conceived coitally and had a child who eventually served as a suitable bone
marrow donor for Anissa. See id.
320. See id. at 1380-81.
321. See id. at 1381.
322. See The Clone Age, supra note 44, at 69.
323. See Robertson, supra note 207, at 1376.
324. See Sheep Clones Bred for Medicine, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 19, 1997, at A2.
325. See Sharon Begley, Little Lamb, Who Made Thee?, NEwWSVEEK, Mar. 10, 1997, at
52, 55.
326. See id.
327. The Roslin Institute scientists were attempting to genetically alter sheep and cows
so that they would produce milk with human proteins. See id. at 55-56.
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genes.328 Polly and Molly, the two new sheep, were cloned through
the use of cells from sheep fetuses,3 29 unlike Dolly who was cloned
from an adult somatic cell. Both Molly and Polly have copies of a
human gene that will cause them to produce a blood-clotting protein
in their milk, a protein which can save the lives of hemophiliacs.33 °
Animal cloning may also be beneficial as a tool for research in
gene therapy. For instance, some studies call for the introduction of
particular gene mutations into mice in order to study the effects of
specific genes.331 Traditionally, causing these gene mutations would
require alteration of embryonic cells that developed into a mouse; this
mouse would have to mate again to produce the necessary transmis-
sion of the gene mutation.3 32 SCNT would speed up the process by
eliminating the second mating and allow gene alteration in larger
mammals.333 In another capacity, cloning can be employed to yield
numerous genetically identical animals, thereby eliminating genetic
variation as a frustrating variable in scientific experiments.
334
In its direct application to humans, cloning may be used to avoid
reproducing a genetic defect. 335 For example, if there is a one-in-four
chance that a couple may transmit a genetic disease to their offspring,
more traditional methods would have the couple conceive and then do
genetic screening.336 If the child tested positive for the disease, the
couple would face the difficult decision of whether to end the preg-
nancy.3 37 Utilizing human cloning, the couple could clone a person
lacking that genetic trait, thus averting a potentially tough choice and/
or a challenging family life.
d. Other Potential Scientific Advances
Finally, as evidenced by the animal cloning research that led to
Dolly, cloning will generate scientific advances. In addition, research
can serendipitously lead to other sometimes unrelated develop-
ments.338 Allowing cloning research to go forth can provide addi-
328. See Sheep Clones Bred for Medicine, supra note 324, at A2.
329. See id.
330. See id.




335. See Sullivan, supra note 302, at C4.
336. See Robertson, supra note 207, at 1379.
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338. For example, in 1896, Wilhelm Conrad Roentgen accidentally discovered the X-
ray while experimenting with cathode rays. See MICROSOFr ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA
(1999). Also, in 1928, Sir Alexander Fleming accidentally discovered penicillin, a deriva-
tive of mold. See id. Its effectiveness against many forms of disease-producing bacteria
eventually led to the development of antibiotics. See id. In addition, in 1945, Percy Spen-
tional knowledge. What society chooses to do with it is up for
discussion, but it should nonetheless progress towards acquiring that
knowledge.
IV. Proposed Legal Framework for Cloning
A. Summary of Legislative Action
Ian Wilmut announced the creation of Dolly in late February
1997. 339 Immediately thereafter, on March 4, 1997, President Clinton
issued an executive order banning federal funds for use in human
cloning.340 Later, in June 1997, the NBAC published its report and
urged continuance of the moratorium on federal funding for cloning
of humans.34 ' In addition, the NBAC report advised private research-
ers to voluntarily comply with the moratorium.342 Finally, the Com-
mission recommended that federal law be enacted to "prohibit anyone
from attempting ... to create a child through somatic cell nuclear
transfer cloning. ' '343 Along with this prohibition, the NBAC asked for
a sunset clause so that Congress could re-examine the need for the
prohibition in three to five years. 344 The general consensus of legisla-
tive forces is against human cloning. Despite the introduction of sev-
eral bills attempting to limit research funds for cloning and to prohibit
human cloning,345 as of March 1999, Congress has yet to pass any
comprehensive federal cloning legislation.
Following the announcement of Dolly, some states tried to legis-
late against human cloning. For instance, in Indiana, a law was pro-
posed to revoke the license of any hospital or doctor that participates
in human cloning research.346 The Mississippi legislature sought to
ban somatic cell nuclear transfer with human cells only when there is
intent to create a pregnancy.
347
cer was working with a magnetron designed to produce short radio waves for a radar sys-
tem. See id. While standing too close to magnetron, he noticed that the candy bar in his
pocket melted, and yet he felt no heat. See id. His discovery led to the invention of the
microwave oven. See id.
339. See Pimple, supra note 1, at 727.
340. See Forsythe, supra note 12, at 469.
341. See id at 470.
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SPRING 19991 CLONING AND OTI--ER ART
784 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26:741
As of March 1999, only two states have successfully passed legis-
lation regulating human cloning. California was first when, in Octo-
ber 1997, it passed a five-year ban on human cloning via somatic cell
nuclear transfer. 48 In July 1998, Rhode Island enacted a similar stat-
ute barring human cloning for five years 4.3 9 At least nine other states
have considered such bills.
35 0
After Dr. Seed declared his intention to clone a human, President
Clinton, in his January 1998 State of the Union address, asked Con-
gress to enact a temporary ban on implanting cloned human em-
bryos.351  Congress is contemplating bills submitted by both
Republicans and Democrats, which would seek to ban human clon-
ing.35 2 This request is representative of most cloning proposals, in
which the focus is not to intrude upon scientific research, but to pre-
vent the production of cloned children. 53
B. Constitutional Precedent Lacking
Surveying constitutional legal precedent demonstrates that the
Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether a fundamen-
tal right to procreate extends to a right to employ assisted reproduc-
tive technologies. 35 4 Nevertheless, since the Court has recognized
privacy rights in procreation, it would seem illogical to uphold those
privacy rights only in the case of natural, but not artificial, procrea-
tion.355 By declaring a right to procreation, the Court does not appear
to be protecting the act of sexual intercourse, but the right to conceive
or not.
356
Because there appears to be no constitutional doctrine expressly
forbidding human cloning, that does not translate into a scientific
"green light" to clone at will. Our "living" Constitution must always
348. See CAL. HEArH & SAFETY CODE § 24185 (West 1998).
349. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-16.4-2 (1998).
350. See S. 476, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1999); H.R. 5042, 1999 Reg. Sess. (Conn.
1999); S. 649, 91st Leg., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1999); S. 1394, 181st Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess.
(Mass. 1999); H.R. 4962, 89th Leg., 1998 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1998); H.R. 2730, 80th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1998); S. 1954, 222d Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999); S. 218, 122d Leg., 1997-98
Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1998); S. 1285, 182d Leg., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1998). This survey was
last conducted in March 1999. See also Human Cloning, supra note 206, at 2352 (citing bills
in at least twenty-two states - Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia, and West Virginia - and published in June 1998).
351. See Forsythe, supra note 12, at 469-70.
352. See Human Cloning, supra note 206, at 2352.
353. See id.
354. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992).
355. See Perry & Schneider, supra note 183, at 470.
356. See id.
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be tempered by the public policy determined by society. Congress
may still attempt to pass a uniform ban on human cloning. With the
potential challenges to such a law nearly certain,357 federal legislators
would be wise to enact a law that represents a compromise between
those that fear the mass production of humans and those that see
cloning as merely another scientific advancement. In addition, those
that would favor no governmental interference at all may prefer at
least some modicum of regulation because of the possibility that re-
sourceful Congresspersons can always find some rationale to legislate.
It may be better to have some existing law whose course one had an
active role in shaping, rather than live with the constant threat of im-
pending stringent legislation.
C. Complete Ban Unjustified
Although there has been some legislative action to the contrary, a
careful analysis reveals that a complete federal ban on cloning is not
justified. In large part, the potential harms offered by opponents of
cloning are highly speculative. And of those that are not speculative,
namely the concerns of possible abuse of technology, they can be ad-
dressed by appropriate implementation of human cloning. Further-
more, various forms of technology have the capacity to be abused;
cloning is not unique in this sense.
Granted, because human cloning has yet to be accomplished, its
short- and long-term effects are unknown. However, the fact that
there are unascertained results is no reason not to go forward with the
research into possible implementation of human cloning. Cloning re-
search should follow the wisdom of other scientific developments by
proceeding with caution, but proceeding nonetheless. Only in this
way can society establish reliable methods of this technology and de-
termine the acceptable and unacceptable applications of cloning.
Furthermore, as a treatment for infertility, cloning is still most
analogous to reproduction. In both traditional reproduction and this
application of cloning ("infertility cloning"), the intent is to create and
raise a child in a family setting. One's form of "conception" is only
one of many strands that contribute to one's life and the broad notion
of reproduction. Of greater importance is the nurturing environment
of a person's upbringing consisting of gestation, family relations, edu-
cation, and personal experience. In fact, relative to these factors, the
method of one's conception, whether coitally or in a petri dish are
nearly inconsequential. Those that call it replication are merely en-
gaging in an exercise in semantics. Constitutional protection of repro-
ductive rights cannot be premised upon the scientific technicalities. If
this were so, the procreative liberty would narrowly protect the micro-
357. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
SPRING 19991
786 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26:741
scopic interactions between a sperm and an egg. Logically, reproduc-
tive liberty must be based upon the personal and private relationships
that develop as a result of creating a child. They are these relation-
ships that infertility cloning aims to nurture and protect.
As reproduction, cloning should be evaluated under constitu-
tional analysis as part of a person's fundamental procreative liberty.
The appropriate rubric for a procreative right is the strict scrutiny
standard. Hence, any legislation on human cloning would have to
serve a compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to
meet that interest.
35
However, when considering cloning for other uses such as medi-
cal research or organ replacement, no such fundamental rights are im-
plicated. Therefore, Congress could feasibly pass a ban on human
cloning for these uses as long as there was a rational basis for such
legislation. A qualifying rational basis could include concerns of com-
modification, psychological harm, or "family" values.
Accordingly, Congress should enact a law in which human clon-
ing is prohibited except for use as a treatment for infertility. "Infertil-
ity" would be defined as the persistence of a couple's inability to
conceive after exhausting all other infertility treatments. Also, "all
other infertility treatments" should only include those methods gener-
ally accepted by reasonable medical standards. This law should have a
sunset clause allowing Congress to reexamine the necessity of this law
every eighteen months. Note that this period is shorter than the pe-
riod recommended by the NBAC because, in light of the frequency of
recent cloning developments, advances in technology may come
sooner than the NBAC expects.
D. Continue Research While Monitoring
In the meanwhile, the scientific community should continue re-
search in the cloning area, while reporting new developments as
quickly as possible. Ironically, it is probably the scientific community
that least needs to be told how to proceed. As a matter of practice,
scientific developments are generally publicly announced promptly.
Scientists understand both that the advances in all areas of science
depend on the collective knowledge in the public domain and that one
only receives credit for that which he or she admits.
The NBAC and Congress should monitor the progress of cloning.
As new information comes forth, we must constantly re-evaluate what
applications of this information are permissible. To facilitate this
monitoring, a new cloning law should include a temporary morato-
rium on human cloning. Thus, Congress should ban public funding for
358. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997).
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research that attempts to employ human cloning. Research intended
for eventual application to humans could still go forward, but would
have to stop short of actual clinical trials of cloning humans. At this
point, evaluations would be made and legislative action could be
taken as needed. Furthermore, the federal government should ask for
a voluntary moratorium on human cloning by private institutions and
the international scientific community.
This broad moratorium would stay in effect until the cloning tech-
nique is perfected in animals. In order to establish a safe and reliable
cloning technique in animals, scientists would need to accumulate data
that reflected the long-term effects of cloning in several generations of
animals as well as determine a procedure that could be reproduced
consistently and safely. In the meantime, the lifting of the morato-
rium should also be conditioned upon the determination of the situa-
tions in which human cloning would be permitted. A consensus on
this would be difficult on a national level, but national regulation is
critical to the stability of the family unit, a touchstone of American
society. The task of reaching national agreement could be taken up
by the same National Bioethics Advisory Commission that reviewed
the legal and ethical issues of cloning technology earlier in 1997.159
The Committee could discuss the merits of human cloning for replac-
ing a dying child, for creating a younger identical twin of an existing
child, or for creating a child that is a clone of a living adult.
E. Engage Public Discussion
Besides seeking advice from the NBAC, there should be open dis-
cussion among medical and legal academia and the general public.
The NBAC should oversee these discussions and report to Congress
periodically on the academic thought and public perception and opin-
ion surrounding human cloning.
The United States should also initiate the formation of an inter-
national body to discuss worldwide developments in human cloning.
The United Nations would be the most appropriate organization to
implement this plan. The international body should meet annually to
discuss problems and exchange possible solutions that the issue of
human cloning has raised. Because reproduction is a common experi-
ence not constrained by geographical boundaries, nations would bene-
fit from a communal body of knowledge, which would facilitate a
faster learning curve.
Appropriate public policy and democratic ideals dictate that we
reach a consensus. If we are to meet those duties, we must seek the
most input from the widest cross-section of people. Only then can the
359. See The Clone Age, supra note 44, at 68.
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resolution be a true consensus and thus, the best legislative framework
for human cloning.
V. Conclusion
Although human cloning involves a new type of reproductive
technology, it should be treated like the other prior ART until there is
a reason to doubt its effectiveness or propriety. In truth, similar to the
other ART, cloning implicates the fundamental and constitutional
right to privacy and its offshoot, the right to procreate. Also, even
though regulation of cloning may be permitted under Congress' com-
merce power, such legislation would need to take into consideration
other societal concerns - such as the need for cloning for couples un-
able to have children otherwise - and meet the strict scrutiny standard
required of laws regulating fundamental rights. Furthermore, as with
the surrogacy technique, constitutional issues raised in cloning may be
subordinated to the child's best interests, which are yet to be deter-
mined in the cloning context. Finally, if a clone is perceived as private
property, any law banning cloning may be unconstitutional as a tak-
ing. Whatever the actual regulation is, this new law must certainly go
beyond the letter of the law to account for policy concerns about
human individuality and integrity.
A fear of the unknown is natural. It is precisely this fear that
drives certain legislators and scientists to seek to prohibit all cloning
research. This fear, however, should not paralyze society, but should
provide the necessary impetus to learn more about human cloning and
its possible applications. Barring the fears of a Brave New World,360
any further apprehension of human cloning is premature. Until soci-
ety and science determine the questions and tentative answers, we
should maintain an open mind to potential ideas that cloning may
make a reality. We must admit that American society has attained
success because of our independent spirit and ability to embrace the
new. Indeed, "[t]he fact is that, in America, cloning may be bad but
telling people how they should reproduce is worse .... ,361
360. HUXLEY, supra note 244.
361. See Gina Kolata, On Cloning Humans, 'Never' Turns Swiftly Into 'Why Not,' N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1997, at Al (quoting Dr. Steen Willadsen, a cloning pioneer, from St. Bar-
nabas Hospital in New Jersey).
